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ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc.: A Workable Standard, 
an Unworkable Decision* 
Jacy T. Jasmer** 
I don’t know why this has happened to me.  I work hard and I’m 
dedicated, but overall I’m totally surprised.  What did I do to 
deserve this? 
-Vanna White1 
 
The celebrity is a person who is known for his well-
knownness . . . He is neither good nor bad, great nor petty.  He is 
the human pseudo event. 
-Daniel Boorstin2 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1997 Tiger Woods became the youngest golfer ever to 
win the Masters Tournament3.  Artist Rick Rush 
commemorated the historic event in a painting titled “The 
Masters of Augusta”, which he later sold to the public.4  Tiger 
Woods subsequently sued Rush, asserting that the painting 
violated Woods’s right of publicity.5  Rush claimed First 
Amendment protection for his work, and both the district court 
and the Sixth Circuit agreed.6  In its decision the Sixth Circuit 
adopted the test created by the California Supreme Court in 
 
* This article is published online at http://mipr.umn.edu. 
** J.D. Candidate, 2005, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A., 2002, 
University of North Dakota.  For my parents, who will never know how much 
they are appreciated. 
 1. Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture 
and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 127, 127 (1993) (citing Dan Hurley, The 
End of Celebrity, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Dec. 1988, at 50, 55 (quoting Vanna 
White)). 
 2. Id. at 127-28 (citing Daniel J. Boorstin, The Image: A Guide to Pseudo 
Events in America 57 (1961)). 
 3. ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g., Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 918 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 919; ETW v. Jireh Publ’g., Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 829 (N.D. Ohio 
2000). 
JASMER FORMATTED 05/12/2004  12:55 PM 
294 MINNESOTA INTEL. PROPERTY REVIEW [Vol. 5:2 
 
Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc. 7,8  Known 
as the “transformative elements” test, it is the most recent 
judicial attempt to strike a balance between a celebrity’s right 
of publicity and an artist’s or author’s First Amendment rights.  
It states that  “[w]hen artistic expression takes the form of a 
literal depiction or imitation of a celebrity for commercial gain, 
directly trespassing on the right of publicity without adding 
significant expression beyond that trespass, the state law 
interests in protecting the fruits of artistic labor outweighs the 
expressive interests of the imitative artist.”9  However, “when a 
work contains significant transformative elements, it is not 
only especially worthy of First Amendment protection, but it is 
also less likely to interfere with the economic interest protected 
by the right of publicity.”10 
This Comment first addresses the inconsistent and 
evolving background of the right of publicity, including the 
justifications for the right, its tension with the First 
Amendment, and judicial and academic attempts to balance the 
two.  The Comment then explains the ETW Corp. v. Jireh 
Publishing, Inc.11 decision in light of this background, focusing 
on the Sixth Circuit’s application of the “transformative 
elements” test.  It is the position of this Comment that while 
the “transformative elements” test is essentially workable, the 
ETW court’s application of the test was faulty and has the 
potential to unjustly derail the test’s usefulness.  However, by 
recognizing these faults and making a few simple changes, 
future courts can ensure that this test receives proper analysis. 
This will prevent critics from convincing courts and scholars 
that the test has no value to the ongoing debate regarding the 
proper way to balance the right of publicity with the First 
Amendment. 
I. THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 
The right of publicity is generally recognized as an 
intellectual property right.12  Its justifications, which include 
moral rights, the prevention of unjust enrichment, and the 
 
 7. 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001). 
 8. ETW, 332 F.3d 915. 
 9. Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 808. 
 10. Id. 
 11. 332 F.3d 915. 
 12. Gil Peles, Comedy III Productions v. Saderup, 17 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 549, 550 (2002). 
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preservation of economic incentives, are controversial.13  The 
right of publicity often conflicts with the First Amendment 
rights of freedom of speech and expression.  In light of the 
questionable justifications behind the right of publicity, courts 
have struggled for many years to find the appropriate balance 
between the two.14  A recent solution to this conflict was the 
“transformative elements” test set forth in Comedy III.15  This 
decision spurred considerable discussion and debate, and 
several commentators proposed a number of alternatives to this 
test.16  Therefore, at the time of the ETW17 decision, the 
standard for determining the right of publicity in the Sixth 
Circuit was uncertain. 
A. THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY’S ORIGIN 
The right of publicity can be defined as “the right of a 
celebrity (or other person) to prevent others from using his or 
her name, likeness, or . . . ‘identity’ for commercial purposes 
without a license.”18  A product of slow evolution, its ancestors 
include unfair competition, misappropriation, tort, fraud, and 
most importantly, the right of privacy.19  More recently courts 
 
 13. See infra text accompanying notes 27-46. 
 14. See infra Part I.C. 
 15. 21 P.3d 797. 
 16. See infra Part I.D. 
 17. ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g., Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 18. Stephen R. Barnett, The Right of Publicity Versus Free Speech in 
Advertising: Some Counter-Points to Professor McCarthy, 18 HASTINGS 
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 593, 594 (1996) (citing J. Thomas McCarthy, The Spring 
1995 Horace S. Manges Lecture - The Human Persona as Commercial 
Property: The Right of Publicity, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 129 (1995)). 
 19. See Mark S. Lee, Agents of Chaos: Judicial Confusion in Defining the 
Right of Publicity-Free Speech Interface, 23 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 471, 478 
(2003); John Gillison, Recent Development, California’s Right of Publicity 
Undergoes a Significant Transformation: Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary 
Saderup, Inc., 29 W. ST. U.L. REV. 359, 362 (2002). 
While the “right of privacy” is “primarily intended to protect a person’s 
feelings and sensibilities rather than to safeguard property, business, or other 
pecuniary interests,” the “right of publicity” recognizes that the “association of 
one’s name, face or likeness with a business, product or service creates a 
tangible and salable product in much the same way as property may be 
created by one who organizes under his other name a business to build or sell 
product.”  62A AM. JUR. 2D Privacy § 25 (2003).  Thus, while the rationales for 
a right of publicity can be broken down into specific “economic incentive” 
arguments,  “unjust enrichment” justifications, and even “moral 
justifications,” the right as recognized in the United States is more closely 
aligned with property rights, and as such, primarily protects economic 
interests. 
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and academia have started to view the right of publicity as a 
form of intellectual property.20 
The right of publicity was first recognized in Haelan Labs, 
Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.21 in 1953.22  The U.S. 
Supreme Court approved of a right of publicity in 1977 when it 
held that a news station violated a plaintiff’s state law right of 
publicity by videotaping and re-broadcasting his entire human 
cannonball act without permission.23  Today at least thirty-six 
states have adopted some form of a right of publicity either 
through a statute or the common law.24 
While the right of privacy has been widely established, 
there has been great disagreement as to its justifications.  In 
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,25 the Supreme 
Court noted that the right of publicity served three basic 
functions: (1) it prevented others from being unjustly enriched 
by the plaintiff’s good will, (2) it kept others from interfering 
with the plaintiff’s right to make a living as an entertainer, and 
(3) it provided entertainers and celebrities an economic 
incentive to continue to invest in creating performances that 
the public could enjoy.26  Courts generally follow Zacchini, but 
disagreements over the relative merit and importance of each 
of these three justifications remains.27 
The economic justification for a right of publicity is heavily 
relied upon by courts and scholars, despite the fact that this 
justification is quite controversial.28  As some critics note, the 
right of publicity “rewards far more than exemplary 
achievement; it offers no incentives to those who become 
famous accidentally, such as lottery winners.”29  This statement 
 
 20. See Peles, supra note 12. 
 21. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953). 
 22. Lee, supra note 19, at 478; Gillison, supra note 19, at 362. 
 23. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1976). 
 24. Lee, supra note 19, at 479. 
 25. 433 U.S. 562. 
 26. Id. at 576. 
 27. Vincent M. de Grandpré, Understanding the Market for Celebrity: An 
Economic Analysis of the Right of Publicity, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 73, 74 (2001).  Mr. de Grandpré notes that some courts 
question whether a right of publicity is justified at all, while others only 
“disagree about the likelihood and extent of injuries that result from 
unauthorized expressive uses of celebrity likeness.”  Id. at 74. 
 28. See infra notes 29-34 and accompanying text. 
 29. de Grandpré, supra note 27, at 101-02 (citing JULIUS C.S. PINCKAERS, 
FROM PRIVACY TOWARD A NEW INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHT IN PERSONA 
245-49 (1996)). 
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requires an inquiry into whether the right of publicity is the 
best way to promote fame and achievement.30  Fame existed 
long before the right of publicity was invented, and “no one 
apparently needed the law’s protection to become famous before 
this century.”31  Nevertheless, while a right of publicity might 
only give minimal incentive to create fame, it offers greater 
incentives to prevent the over-exploitation of a celebrity’s image 
or persona.32  It is not clear, however, that society needs to 
prevent over-exploitation of a celebrity’s image.  Not “all uses of 
human identity tire the public”;33 and certain uses of a 
celebrity’s persona may actually increase the so-called “shelf 
life” of the celebrity’s image or fame.34 
The moral rights justification35 for the right of publicity is 
 
 30. Id. at 102.  Mr. de Grandpré notes: 
Even without invoking such an extreme case [as the lottery winner 
example], the importance of skills or talent in the making of celebrity 
should not be overstated.  Fame rewards pure talent only unreliably 
and, as the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION points 
out: ‘[i]n other cases the commercial value acquired by a person’s 
identity is largely fortuitous or otherwise unrelated to any investment 
made by the individual, thus diminishing the weight of the property 
and unjust enrichment rationales for protection.’ 
Id.  He continues by explaining that “[m]arginal analysis tells us nothing 
about how much the right of publicity contributes to the overall supply of 
celebrity” since the “elusive character of fame probably makes it difficult for 
an aspiring celebrity to assess rationally the marginal value of additional 
preparation.”  Id. 
 31. de Grandpré, supra note 27, at 103. 
 32. Id.  de Grandpré states that the “over-exploitation” rationale is the 
“better argument” for a right of publicity, but he still finds it insufficient in a 
number of ways.  See infra notes 33-34 and accompanying text. 
 33. de Grandpré, supra note 27, at 104.  de Grandpré criticizes the “over-
exploitation” argument by stating that while “individual consumption of 
celebrity identity . . . results in negative externalities” it also “leads to positive 
network effects.”  Id.  This occurs because “[m]any uses of celebrity identity 
are faddish and, at certain points along the demand curve for celebrity goods 
and services, individual consumptions are not rivalrous, but complementary.”  
Id.  This occurs for two reasons: a “bandwagon effect, in which early 
consumption of goods by some people modifies the tastes of others” and 
because “consumption and learning may take place simultaneously.”  Id. at 
105. 
 34. Id. at 104.  Such uses are primarily informative.  See id. at 105.  While 
unauthorized uses of a person’s identity in news, magazines, etc. do “cause 
congestion externalities by adding to a celebrity’s exposure” the “informative 
character of these uses creates net positive externalities because . . . [they] 
enrich the social meaning of celebrities.”  Id. 
 35. The moral justification argument is best described as a “fruits of labor 
argument” and is closely related to the “unjust enrichment” justification.  See 
infra notes 36-41. 
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likewise controversial.  A common premise in intellectual 
property law is that a person is entitled to the fruits of his or 
her labor.36  It can be argued that celebrities “work[] hard to 
create an identity that has commercial value.”37  Therefore, 
they deserve the benefits gained from this identity.  This 
argument, however, ignores the fact that the idea of “celebrity” 
is the result of a “complex social . . . process in which the ‘labor’ 
(time, money, effort) of the celebrity herself (and of the 
celebrity industry, too) is but one ingredient, and not always 
the main one.”38  While a celebrity can, to a certain extent, 
increase her strength, knowledge, or even beauty, she cannot 
make herself famous “any more than [s]he can make [her]self 
loved.”39  Therefore, celebrities and athletes labor to develop 
their own skill but not necessarily to develop the commercial 
value of their images.40  “[N]amely the public image and 
persona of the celebrity, is in large part created by the . . . 
media and society.”41  This undercuts the argument that a 
person attempting to capitalize on a celebrity’s value is taking 
something that is the sole creation of the celebrity. 
Closely related criticism attends the unjust enrichment 
justification for the right of publicity.  The Supreme Court has 
viewed the use of a person’s identity without his or her 
permission as a “theft of good will.”42  Such use is seen as 
“‘reaping’ where others have ‘sown.’”43  However, this argument 
is questionable as well.  Not only do celebrities “develop 
their . . . craft . . . using already-existing forms, sounds, 
narratives, and images”,44 but the use of their identity may 
actually “advance the development of the sport”45 or art as a 
 
 36. Jessica Villardi, ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc.: Why the First 
Amendment Should Trump the Right of Publicity When Art Imitates Life, 34 
CONN. L. REV. 293, 298-99 (2001) (citing Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of 
Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 216 (1954)). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Villardi, supra note 36, at 299 (citing Michael Madow, Private 
Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. 
REV. 125, 195 (1993)). 
 39. Id. (citing Madow, supra note 38, at 188). 
 40. See id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1976). 
 43. Villardi, supra note 36, at 299. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id.  Villardi explains that “modern athletes . . . often use techniques 
invented by other previous greats in order to advance the development of a 
sport as a whole.”  Id.  Viewed in that light, “reaping” where others have 
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whole, increasing its value.  In turn, the celebrity may reap 
greater benefits as an indirect result of this use, in the form of 
monetary gain, recognition, or personal satisfaction with their 
achievements.46  If such a chain of events occurs, the value of 
the celebrity’s identity can not only be credited to their own 
talent, but also to the general popularity of the game they play, 
music they perform, or the art they create. 
B. CONFLICTING INTERESTS AMONG THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 
AND FIRST AMENDMENT 
Not surprising, the right of publicity and the First 
Amendment are often in tension with one another.47  The First 
 
“sown” actually helps create great athletes.”  Id. 
 46. It is a logical extension from Villardi’s argument, supra note 36, that 
if the popularity of a sport increases due to an athlete’s personal 
achievements, the increased interest in the sport will filter down to the athlete 
as an individual, resulting in increased promotional opportunities and media 
recognition of the athlete (or celebrity’s) personal efforts.  Thus, the cyclical 
nature of an athlete’s own achievement may both directly and indirectly 
promote celebrity. 
 47. Artistic expression, among other things, can be considered “speech” for 
purposes of the First Amendment.  See CHEMERINSKY, ERWIN, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES, §11.3.7.1-3 (Aspen L. & Bus. 
1997).  First Amendment concerns are generally implicated when a state 
restricts free speech in some form, such as when it recognizes a right of 
publicity.  See Villardi, supra note 36.  While forms of speech considered to be 
“commercial” were once unprotected, the Supreme Court changed this in 1976 
when it ruled that “commercial speech,” in addition to speech that is 
considered “newsworthy,” is protected by the First Amendment, although to a 
lesser extent.  See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer 
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761-62 (1976).  The Supreme Court has developed 
a strict test for determining the constitutionality of commercial speech: 
“[C]ommerical speech may be freely regulated, or even banned, if it is ‘false, 
deceptive, or misleading’; but . . . otherwise . . . only if ‘the State shows that 
the restriction directly and materially advances a substantial state interest in 
a manner no more extensive than necessary to serve that interest.’”  Barnett, 
supra note 18, at 599-600 (citing Ibanez v. Florida Dept. of Bus. & Prof. 
Regulation, 512 U.S. 136, 142 (1994)).  However, while the “commercial” – 
“newsworthy” distinction is no longer supposed to strictly determine the 
answer to the preliminary question of whether a particular form of speech gets 
protection, some argue that it does still seem to matter.  Villardi, supra note 
36, at 301-02.  Whether or not the “commercial” – “newsworthy” distinction 
should matter, and how much it should determine whether or not something 
gets full First Amendment protection, remains controversial.  See, e.g., Ralph 
S. Brown, Copyright and its Upstart Cousin: Privacy, Publicity, Unfair 
Competition: The Sixteenth Donald C. Brace Memorial Lecture, 33 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y USA 301 (1986); Rosemary J. Coombe, Author/izing the 
Celebrity: Publicity Rights, Postmodern Politics, and Unauthorized Genders, 
10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENTER. L.J. 365 (1992); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, 
Amicus Curiae Brief of Seventy-Three Law Professors in Support of Jireh 
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Amendment’s goals of promoting an open marketplace of ideas 
and freedom of self-expression mean that artists, media, and 
other interested parties must be able to write about and 
interpret “the thought process of illustrious individuals who 
have shaped our society.”48  If the three justifications for the 
right of publicity noted above are correct, this view directly 
conflicts with the right of entertainers to control the use of 
their talent and persona for their own gain.49  Furthermore, 
any unauthorized use of another person’s intellectual property 
in their image “chills speech by increasing the cost of creating 
works.”50  On the other hand, giving others free rein to use of 
such property also “chills speech, since it chills [both] the 
creation of intellectual property” and “the cost of creating 
works” in general.51 
The tension between the right of publicity and the First 
Amendment right of freedom of expression becomes especially 
strong when the person attempting to enforce the right is 
someone whose “exploits, activities, accomplishments, and 
[even] personal life” are subjected to the spotlight.52  Such 
individuals have become part of the fabric of our culture, and 
thus the use of their personas becomes important to debate on 
public issues, especially those dealing with culture and 
values.53  Celebrities often acquire a personal meaning to many 
 
Publishing, Inc., 22 WHITTIER L. REV. 391, 406-07 (2000) (arguing that the 
“commercial” – “newsworthy” distinction in right of publicity/First 
Amendment jurisprudence is outdated and that the Supreme Court rejected 
this distinction in Zacchini). 
 48. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Right of Publicity vs. the First 
Amendment: A Property and Liability Rule Analysis, 70 IND. L.J. 47, 68 
(1994). 
 49. When a right of publicity exists, a court typically orders a defendant to 
stop the unauthorized use of the celebrity’s likeness or image.  Villardi, supra 
note 36, at 300.  Defendants may then use the First Amendment right to free 
speech and freedom of expression as a defense that their use of the “celebrity’s 
image or likeness is speech that is entitled to constitutional protection and 
cannot be restricted by the state.”  Id.  Allowing the defendant in such a case 
to continue using the celebrity’s likeness may result in monetary detriment to 
the celebrity, unjust enrichment of the defendant, and a decrease in incentive 
for the plaintiff celebrity to continue creating.  Id.  However, if the defendant 
is ordered to stop using the celebrity’s likeness, her expression is restricted by 
the court—an arm of the government—which may be considered a violation of 
the First Amendment right to freedom of speech or expression.  Id. 
 50. Lee, supra note 19, at 479. 
 51. Id. at 479-80. 
 52. ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g., Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 931 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 53. Comedy III Prod., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 803 (Cal. 
2001). 
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fans, making the celebrity persona an “important avenue of 
individual expression.”54  However, public figures often put a 
vast amount of resources into developing their “prominence in a 
particular field.”55  Years of work may be required before any 
economic return on the investment is realized.56  “For some, 
[this] investment may eventually create considerable 
commercial value in one’s identity.”57 
C. STRIKING A BALANCE 
For decades, courts have struggled to find the appropriate 
balance between a public figure’s right of publicity and the 
First Amendment protection of the freedom of expression.  
Courts have held that the unauthorized use of a celebrity’s 
signature phrase58 and a robot designed to mimic the physical 
appearance and usual activities of an actress were violations of 
celebrities’ rights of publicity.59  Others have asserted that 
marketing of an action figure with a resemblance to an actor’s 
character60 and the sale of baseball cards featuring caricatures 
of players and sarcastic commentary on their careers were 
protected expression.61 
The recent cases of Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.62 
and Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc.,63 
illustrate that the difficulties courts encounter in striking this 
balance are still contemporary challenges.  In Hoffman, Capital 
 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 804. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th 
Cir. 1983) (holding that Johnny Carson’s right of publicity was invaded by a 
company’s use of his identity for commercial exploitation, even though his 
name and likeness were not used). 
 59. See White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(refusing to reconsider a petition for rehearing of the panel holding that an 
electronic robot that bore an uncanny similarity to Vanna White violated her 
right of publicity). 
 60. See Landham v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 227 F.3d 619, 625-26 (6th 
Cir. 2000) (holding that an actor did not show a violation of his right of 
publicity by failing to establish that his persona had significant value or that 
the action figure invoked his persona as separate from the character he 
portrayed). 
 61. See Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 
959, 976 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that parody trading cards did not infringe 
on players’ rights of publicity). 
 62. 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 63. 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001). 
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Cities Media used Dustin Hoffman’s 1982 movie character, 
“Tootsie”, in a magazine.64  Sticking to the historic, 
commercial/non-commercial distinction used by many courts, 
the Ninth Circuit noted that “in context, the article as a whole 
is a combination of fashion photography, humor, and visual and 
verbal editorial comment on classic films and famous actors.65  
Any commercial aspects are ‘inextricably entwined’ with 
expressive elements, and so they cannot be separated out ‘from 
the fully protected whole.’”66  The court therefore held that 
Capital Cities’ use of “Tootsie” was entitled to the full 
protection under the First Amendment.67  In Comedy III, the 
California Supreme Court similarly noted that the defendant’s 
works were “non-commercial” for purposes of a First 
Amendment analysis68 but used a far different approach to the 
constitutional issue presented by defendant Saderup’s cartoon 
drawings of the Three Stooges.  The court stated the test for 
determining whether an artist’s work is protected by the First 
Amendment as follows: 
  When artistic expression takes the form of a literal depiction or 
imitation of a celebrity for commercial gain, directly trespassing on 
the right of publicity without adding significant expression beyond 
that trespass, the state law interest in protecting the fruits of artistic 
labor outweighs the expressive interests of the imitative artist.  On 
the other hand, when a work contains significant transformative 
elements, it is not only especially worthy of First Amendment 
protection, but it is also less likely to interfere with the economic 
interest protected by the right of publicity. . . . Accordingly, First 
Amendment protection of such works outweighs whatever interest the 
state may have in enforcing the right of publicity.69 
Later in the opinion, the court stated that another way to 
look at this test is to determine whether the celebrity’s image 
was one of the “raw materials” from which the author created 
the original work, or whether the image was an imitation that 
constituted the very substance of the artist’s piece.70  The court 
further emphasized that in applying this test, courts were “not 
to be concerned with the quality of artistic contribution”, nor 
 
 64. Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1180. 
 65. Id. at 1185. 
 66. Id. (citing Gaudiya Vaishnava Soc’y v. City & County of San 
Francisco, 952 F.2d 1059, 1064 (9th Cir. 1990) (as amended). 
 67. Id. at 1189. 
 68. Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 802 (stating that “the present case does not 
concern commercial speech . . .  Saderup’s portraits . . . are expressive works 
and not an advertisement for or endorsement of a product”). 
 69. Id. at 808 (emphasis added). 
 70. Id. at 809. 
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were they to assume that a “literal depiction of a celebrity, even 
if accomplished with great skill” would not be subject to 
challenge.71 
In addition, the Comedy III court added a second 
“subsidiary inquiry”, intended to be helpful, but not 
determinative, on the issue of whether the art had significant 
“transformative elements” to allow it to be protected.72  The 
“subsidiary inquiry” asked a court to consider the extent to 
which the “marketability and economic value of the challenged 
work derive[d] primarily from the fame of the celebrity 
depicted.”73  Overall the court stated that the “transformative 
elements” test was to be “quantitative [rather] than qualitative, 
asking whether the literal and imitative or the creative 
elements predominate[d] in the work.”74  The Comedy III court 
went on to hold that the cartoon drawings in question violated 
Comedy III’s right of publicity because it found “no significant 
transformative or creative contribution” in them.75  While 
admitting that Saderup had considerable skill, it stated that 
this skill was “manifestly subordinated to the overall goal of 
creating literal, conventional depictions of the Three Stooges so 
as to exploit their fame”, and that “the marketability and 
economic value of Saderup’s work” was derived from the fame 
of the Three Stooges.76  Thus, for Saderup to continue using the 
images, he would have to seek permission from Comedy III.77 
D. SOLUTIONS 
The “transformative elements” test espoused in Comedy III 
has come under intense criticism.  Some scholars argue that 
the California Supreme Court failed to create a clear standard 
by importing part of an “already confused” paradigm from 
copyright law.78  In addition, such scholars believe that the 
 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 810. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 811. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Pete Singer, Note, The Three Stooges Latest Act: Attempting to Define 
the Scope of Protection the First Amendment Provides to Works of Art 
Depicting Celebrities, Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Saderup, Inc., 27 U. 
DAYTON L. REV. 313, 322-25 (2002).  Singer first attacks the “transformative 
use” test of fair use in copyright law on the grounds that it is “both over and 
under inclusive, allowing pure copying to constitute transformative use in 
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court’s analysis leaves far too many questions unanswered and 
will chill the creation of future artistic works.79  Others cite the 
subsidiary prong as the major problem, since it may apply 
differently to works depicting ordinary people as opposed to 
celebrities and to works created by celebrity artists as opposed 
to non-celebrity artists.80  Finally, the test has simply proven to 
be too “vague to provide proper guidance” for some scholars.81 
The critics of the “transformative elements” test have 
provided a number of possible solutions to the problems of the 
Comedy III decision.  The first, the “Cultural Niche Theory of 
Art” proposes a distinction between “Popular Art” and “Fine 
Art”.  Under this theory, “Fine Art” would be entitled to 
transformative use status and its “concomitant First 
 
some contexts, and over-protecting copyrighted works from seemingly 
transformative uses in others.”  Id. at 323 (footnotes omitted).  Singer then 
suggests the same problem will be imported into right of publicity 
jurisprudence.  Id. at 323-25 (a “parallel path will result in creating the same 
problems of over-and under-protectiveness”). 
 79. See id. at 322-27.  Singer argues against the “transformative use” test 
by highlighting the questions that remain unanswered after the Comedy III 
decision, such as “how does something become recognizably the artist’s own 
work? . . . [W]hen does a work become more than a mere trivial variation?”  Id. 
at 325.  “When does a creative contribution or a significant creative 
contribution occur? . . . [A]t what point do the creative elements of a celebrity 
portraiture dominate the literal and imitative elements of the work?”  Id. at 
326.  Singer argues that so many unanswered questions will chill freedom of 
expression, thereby causing artists to hesitate to experiment with “creative 
modes” since they will be afraid of possible liability.  Id. at 328-30. 
 80. Gillison, supra note 19, at 380.  Gillison argues that the greatest flaw 
with the transformative elements test is that the second, “subsidiary” prong 
rests on the celebrity status of the artist.  Id. at 380.  He states: 
Just as in copyright infringement where it is irrelevant who infringes 
on a person’s right of publicity, there is no exemption here for famous 
people.  The focus of copyright law is on the infringement itself . . . 
[s]o too, with the right of publicity, the focus should not be on who 
created the work, but rather the focus should be on the amount of the 
source that has been appropriated, the nature and purpose of the 
appropriation, the degree of transformation that has taken place, and 
the extent to which the appropriation will detrimentally impact the 
‘source’ celebrity. 
Id. at 381 (emphases omitted) (footnotes omitted).  He also notes that in 
creating the subsidiary test, the Comedy III court “lost sight of the fact that 
anyone’s right of publicity can be infringed upon, even though only celebrities 
will generally litigate this type of tort.”  Id.  Gillison maintains that through 
the transformative elements test, “the court [now] requires the trier of fact to 
define ‘celebrity.’”  Id. 
 81. Peles, supra note 12, at 549-50 (“the court failed to create a clear test 
to determine how much ‘social comment’ must be included in order to be 
considered ‘transformative’”). 
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Amendment protection”, but “Popular Art” would not.82  
Another suggestion is simply to apply the entire “fair use” 
standard used in copyright law to any right of publicity claim.83  
A related proposal includes using a modified “fair use” standard 
that emphasizes the possible economic harm to the celebrity.84  
 
 82. Singer, supra note 78, at 330-32.  Singer advocates Susan B. 
Josephson’s “Cultural Niche Theory of Art” as an alternative to the 
“transformative elements” test.  Id.  Under the theory, “popular art” will not 
receive First Amendment protection, but “fine art” will.  Id. at 333.  “Popular 
art” is work that “is not measured by its creativity.”  Id. at 331. 
Popular Art is very inexpensive compared to Fine Art and is 
marketed in venues where the greatest number of people have access 
to it.  Many copies of the same image can be distributed, all of 
relatively equal value because of its unoriginality or lack of 
uniqueness.  Popular Art tends to use images that are not new, that 
have proven effective in the past, that are conventional and that are 
familiar to people.  Popular Art tends to lack a message or expression 
and is generally ‘meant to entertain, to stimulate emotion, or project 
sentimentality.’ 
Id. at 332 (footnotes omitted). 
“Fine art” on the other hand, “is the result of the artist’s inspiration.”  Id.  
There is generally an original work and any copies “are either sanctioned 
‘reprints’ or they are considered forgeries.”  Id. at 334.  According to this test, 
Singer proffers that the decision in Comedy III would have been the same, but 
the rationale would have been different: 
[B]ecause the inherent qualities of some forms of Popular Art, as 
defined by the Cultural Niche Theory, cause it to fall outside 
transformative use and because Saderup’s depiction of the Three 
Stooges can be categorized as Popular Art, the Comedy III court 
correctly concluded that Saderup’s work was not transformative 
according to the Culture Niche theory.  Further, because original 
works of Popular Art, such as The Three Stooges, require protection 
from appropriation in order to maintain its economic value, the court 
correctly decided to protect Comedy III’s right to the image of The 
Three Stooges by denying Saderup’s work First Amendment 
protection. 
Id. at 336. 
 83. Gillison, supra note 19, at 383-84. 
 84. Peles, supra note 12, at 566.  Peles suggests that a proper test for 
drawing the line between the First Amendment and the right of publicity 
should “separate economic and transformative elements.”  Id. at 564.  Such a 
test would incorporate both the third and fourth “fair use” factors from 
copyright law.  Id. at 565-68.  Copyright’s fourth fair use factor asks a court to 
consider “the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work.”  Id. at 565 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1994)) (quotations 
omitted).  Peles advocates using this question as a “determinative 
consideration” in cases “where it is unclear whether a work is transformative, 
such as with Saderup’s works [in Comedy III].”  Id. at 566.  The third fair use 
factor, the functional test, asks if “regardless of medium, the defendant’s work, 
though containing substantially similar material performs a different function 
than that of the plaintiff’s.”  Id. at 567 (quoting 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & 
DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[B][1] (2001)) (quotations 
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Other possible solutions, proposed prior to the Comedy III 
decision, include “balancing”, “relatedness”, and “alternative 
means” approaches.85 
 
omitted).  Thus, the functional test “finds a use to be fair where its function 
does not act as a market substitution for the original copyrighted work.”  Id.  
In a right of publicity case, this would cause a court to “lean towards fair use 
where expressive elements within a defendant’s works cause consumers to 
purchase those works primarily for the expression, and not the celebrity.”  Id.  
Such “[a]n economic consideration would further decipher whether the 
infringing work performs the same function as the existing market created by 
a celebrity.”  Id. 
 85. See Lee, supra note 19, at 482-86, 496-98 (summarizing the various 
approaches and noting their various strengths and weaknesses). 
The ad hoc balancing test “weigh[s] competing expressive and property 
interests according to unspecified criteria.” Id. at 485.  This approach was 
pioneered by the Second Circuit in Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 
1989), and was more recently used in Westchester Media v. PRL USA 
Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 664 (5th Cir. 2000), and Mattel, Inc. v. MCA 
Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002).  Id. at 484-85 nn.93 & 98 and 
accompanying text.  However, there are four basic problems with such an 
approach: (1) it is “arguably inconsistent with Supreme Court authority,” 
which appears to support the “alternative means” test; (2) it is “ultimately 
unsupported by authority,” since the original Rogers court “cite[d] no authority 
to support the approach it develop[ed]”; (3) it is “not limited by any meaningful 
evaluative guidelines or criteria, and amounts to little more than a Rorschach 
test for a particular judge’s philosophical predilections”; and (4) it can “chill 
speech by creating legal uncertainty as to whether the speech is or is not 
permitted.”  Id. at 485-86. 
The relatedness test allows the use of publicity rights in expressive works if 
“the rights ‘relate’ to the work, but not otherwise.”  Id. at 496-97, quoting 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47, Reporter’s Note & cmts. 
a & c (1993) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT UNFAIR COMPETITION].  Using a 
deceased personality’s identity in “advertising, magazine or newspaper 
articles, biographies, films, or similar works relating to the identified 
individual is not an infringement of the right of publicity,” but “if the name or 
likeness is used solely to attract attention to the work that is not related to the 
identified person, the use may be subject to liability for the use of the other’s 
identity in advertising.”  Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT UNFAIR COMPETITION at § 
47, Reporter’s Note & cmts. a & c) (quotations omitted).  The Kentucky 
Supreme Court using a relatedness test found there was “no right of publicity 
violation from the use of a deceased musical performer’s name and likeness in 
a music video for a song that was a tribute to the deceased musical performer.  
Id. at 497 n.178 and accompanying text (citing Montgomery v. Montgomery, 60 
S.W.3d 524 (Ky. 2001)). 
The alternative means test has not been adopted, but has “been discussed in 
connection with right of publicity claims.”  Id. at 498.  The Tenth Circuit 
applied the test, although overall the court “rejected the ‘adequate alternative 
avenues’ approach in favor of ad hoc balancing.” Id. at 498 n.180 (citing 
Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 971 
(10th Cir. 1996)).  Also called the “alternative means of communication” test, it 
holds “non-commercial speech . . . infringing if there is another way to convey 
the message without infringing intellectual property rights.”  Id. at 482-83.  
JASMER FORMATTED 05/12/2004  12:55 PM 
2004] A WORKABLE STANDARD 307 
 
E. A NEW STANDARD 
Thus, by the time ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc.86 
was decided by the Sixth Circuit in 2003, the right of publicity 
had already gone through a number of transformations and 
interpretations, but remained uncertain.87  Starting out as an 
amalgam of other rights, its justifications have been questioned 
and, arguably, remain fairly weak.  The tension between the 
right of publicity and the First Amendment has continued to 
cause strife in both the academic world and the courts.  
According to the Comedy III decision, the “transformative 
elements” test purportedly solved the issue of which standard 
to apply when balancing the two rights.88  However, the test 
was strongly criticized, and scholars subsequently advocated a 
number of alternative options for striking a balance.89  In the 
shadow of this scholarly debate, the parties in ETW faced an 
uncertain outcome as they addressed the issue of whether Rick 
Rush violated Tiger Woods’s right of publicity by creating and 
selling the painting “The Masters of Augusta” in late 1998.90 
II. ETW V. JIREH: “TRANSFORMATIVE ELEMENTS” 
REEMERGE 
To answer the question of whether Rick Rush violated 
Tiger Woods’s right of publicity by creating and selling “The 
Masters of Augusta,” the ETW court analyzed precedent from a 
number of courts, including the Supreme Court, Federal Courts 
of Appeals, and Ohio state courts.91  Settling on the 
“transformative elements” test, it concluded that summary 
judgment should be granted for Rick Rush and left ETW and 
Tiger Woods without a claim on Rush’s proceeds from the 
painting or his attendant rights as creator of that painting.92 
 
While the Supreme Court may have supported this approach to reconcile 
intellectual property rights with First Amendment rights, see id. at 484 (citing 
S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 438 U.S. 522 
(1987)), no appellate court since 1987 has used the approach.  Id. 
 86. 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 87. See supra Part I.C-D. 
 88. See supra Part I.C. 
 89. See supra Part I.D. 
 90. See ETW, 332 F.3d at 918-19. 
 91. Id. at 928-36. 
 92. Id. at 936-38. 
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A. THE FACTS 
In 1997 Tiger Woods, “one of the world’s most famous 
professional golfers,” became the youngest player ever to claim 
a Masters victory.93  His win at Augusta National was made 
even sweeter by the fact that he set a seventy-two hole record 
for the tournament, and completed the event with a twelve 
stroke lead over second place.94  Rick Rush, referred to as 
“America’s sports artist”, commemorated the historic event in a 
painting called “The Masters of Augusta”.95  Rush added the 
painting to his collection of works featuring famous athletes 
and great moments in sports.96  The painting had original and 
expressive compositional elements.  It featured Tiger Woods in 
three poses:97 in the center image, he is swinging a golf club; on 
the left and right, he is crouching to line up a putt with his 
caddy observing.98  In the background Rush portrayed the 
Augusta National Clubhouse, as well as famous golfers from 
the past “looking down” on Woods99 with the Masters leader 
board set behind their images.100  Jireh Publishing sold limited 
edition prints of the painting in the form of fifty serigraphs and 
five thousand lithographs.101  The serigraphs sold for $700 
each, and the lithographs each sold for $100.102 
ETW Corporation, the licensing agent of Tiger Woods,103 
filed suit on June 26, 1998, in the United States District Court 
for the Northern District of Ohio.  The suit alleged, among 
 
 93. Id. at 918. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. (including, for example, Michael Jordan, Mark McGuire, the 
Pebble Beach Golf Tournament, and America’s Cup Yacht Race). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 918-19.  The prints included Rush’s signature at the bottom 
right hand corner.  Id.  The title of the work, “The Masters Of Augusta,” 
appeared below the painting’s image, along with the words “Rick Rush” and 
“Painting America Through Sports.”  Id. at 918.  Each limited edition print 
was enclosed in a white envelope and included a photograph of Rush, a 
description of his art, and a description of the painting itself.  Id.  The name 
“Tiger Woods” appeared on the back of the envelope and is mentioned in the 
description of the painting.  Id. at 918-19. 
 102. Id. at 919. 
 103. Id. at 918.  Tiger Woods is the Chairman of ETW’s board.  Id.  At the 
time of the action, ETW had the exclusive right to exploit Woods’s name, 
image, likeness, and signature, and all other publicity rights.  Id. 
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other things, that Jireh and Rush violated Woods’s right of 
publicity under Ohio common law.104  Jireh counterclaimed, 
seeking a declaratory judgment that Rush’s prints were 
protected by the First Amendment.105  The parties promptly 
moved for summary judgment.106  The district court granted 
Jireh’s motion for summary judgment and then dismissed the 
case.107  ETW appealed this decision.108 
B. THE RESOLUTION 
In order to determine whether the district court’s grant of 
summary judgment on the Ohio state right of publicity claim 
was proper, the Sixth Circuit first examined the right of 
publicity generally.109  The court noted that the right of 
publicity was a state law right that gave rise to “a cause of 
action for the commercial tort of unfair competition.”110  It then 
reviewed Ohio jurisprudence regarding the right of publicity, 
including Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,111 
which first recognized the right in Ohio.112  Noting that the 
 
 104. Id. at 919.  ETW also alleged trademark infringement in violation of 
the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114; dilution of the mark under 15 U.S.C. § 
1125(c); unfair competition and false advertising under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); 
unfair competition and deceptive trade practices under Ohio Revised Code § 
4165.01; and unfair competition and trademark infringement under Ohio 
common law.  Id. 
 105. Id.  Jireh also sought a declaratory judgment that the art prints did 
not violate the Lanham Act.  Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. (citing ETW Corp. v. Jireh Pub. Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 829 (N.D. Ohio 
2000)). 
 108. Id. 
 109. See id. at 928-36. 
 110. Id. at 928. 
 111. 351 N.E.2d 454 (Ohio 1976), rev’d on other grounds, 433 U.S. 562 
(1976) (recognizing a common law “right of publicity” in Ohio). 
 112. ETW, 332 F.3d at 929.  In Zacchini, the Defendant videotaped and 
broadcast the Plaintiff’s human cannonball act.  Zacchini, 351 N.E.2d at 455.  
The Ohio Supreme Court recognized a common law right of publicity in Ohio.  
See id. at 460.  But the court ultimately held that Zacchini’s right was 
trumped by the news service’s First Amendment right.  See id. at 461-62 
(holding that the newscast was “a matter of legitimate public interest”).  The 
United States Supreme Court reversed the Ohio Supreme Court on other 
grounds.  See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578-79 
(1977) (holding that the First Amendment did not require privileging the press 
where the public was not otherwise deprived of the performance in a 
commercial setting).  But the Court upheld Ohio’s state right of publicity.  Id. 
at 576.  Zacchini is the only United States Supreme Court decision dealing 
with the right of publicity.  ETW, 332 F.3d at 929. 
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Ohio Supreme Court had relied heavily on the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts’ formulation of the right of publicity as a 
branch of the right of privacy,113 the ETW court introduced the 
modern version of the right of publicity reformulated in the 
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition as a right to the 
commercial value of a person’s identity.114  The court critically 
examined the rationales for a commercial basis for the right of 
publicity115 and found a limited right, constrained by the 
public’s interest in expression.116  However, the ETW court 
found that the Ohio courts would probably “follow the 
principles of the Restatement in defining the limits of the right 
of publicity” and that the Ohio Supreme Court was “inclined to 
give substantial weight to the public interest in freedom of 
expression when balancing it against the personal and 
proprietary interests recognized by the right of publicity.”117  
The court then examined circuit court cases regarding the right 
 
In addition to the Zacchini decision, the court in ETW looked at Vinci v. 
American Can Co., 459 N.E.2d 507 (Ohio 1984) (reaffirming the right of 
publicity); Bajpayee v. Rothermich, 372 N.E.2d 817 (Ohio Ct. App. 1977) 
(holding that a plaintiff’s right of publicity was violated when the defendant 
represented and presented plaintiff’s research paper as his own at an 
American Society of Clinical Pharmacology and Therapeutic conference); and 
Parma Int’l, Inc. v. Bartos, No. 89CA004573, 1990 WL 11716 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Feb. 7, 1990) (denying summary judgment to a defendant whether he had used 
the plaintiff’s name and likeness on product packaging and in advertising 
information when the plaintiff was no longer employed by the defendant).  See 
ETW, 332 F.3d at 929-33. 
 113. The right of publicity was included in the Restatement in the chapter 
“Invasion of Privacy”.  Id. at 930. The ETW court noted that the court in 
Zacchini “quoted the entire text of § 652 (C) of the Restatement, as well as 
comments a, b, c, and d.”  Id. 
 114. “In 1995, the American Law Institute transferred its exposition of the 
right of publicity to the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition . . . in a 
chapter entitled ‘Appropriation of Trade Values.’”  Id.  The current version 
defines the right of publicity as, “[o]ne who appropriates the commercial value 
of a person’s identity by using without consent the person’s name, likeness, or 
other indicia of identity for purposes of trade is subject to liability.”  Id. at 930 
(quoting RESTATEMENT UNFAIR COMPETITION supra note 85, § 46 (n.d.)). 
 115. Such rationales are “generally less compelling than those that justify 
rights in trademarks or trade secrets.”  Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT UNFAIR 
COMPETITION, supra note 85, § 46, cmt. c (n.d.)). 
 116. The right of publicity is “fundamentally constrained by the public and 
constitutional interest in freedom of expression,” but not “if the name or 
likeness is used solely to attract attention to work that is not related to the 
identified person.”  Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra 
note 85, § 47, cmt. c (n.d.)). 
 117. ETW, 332 F.3d at 931. 
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of publicity,118 focusing heavily on the Comedy III Productions, 
Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc. decision.119 
Based on this extensive discussion, the court set forth the 
rules it would follow when analyzing the case at bar.  It 
concluded that “in deciding whether the sale of Rush’s prints 
violate Woods’s right of publicity, [it would] look to the Ohio 
case law and the Restatement (Third) of Unfair 
Competition.”120  “In deciding where the line should be drawn 
between Woods’s intellectual property rights and the First 
Amendment”, the court stated that it would follow the 
dissenting opinion in White v. Samsung Electronics America, 
Inc.,121 the Tenth Circuit decision in Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major 
League Baseball Players Association,122 and the Ninth Circuit 
decision in Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.123 to determine 
whether “The Masters of Augusta” was protected by the First 
Amendment.124  Finally, the court stated that it believed the 
“transformative elements test adopted by the Supreme Court of 
California” in Comedy III was appropriate for determining 
where the “proper balance l[ay] between the First Amendment 
and Woods’s intellectual property rights.”125 
 
 118. The court looked at Memphis Development Foundation v. Factors Etc., 
Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding that a “right of publicity” is not 
inheritable and so the deceased’s assignee was not able to enjoin a statute 
created in the deceased’s likeness); Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, 
Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding that Johnny Carson’s right of 
publicity was invaded by a company’s use of his identity for commercial 
exploitation, even though his name and likeness were not used); White v. 
Samsung Elecs. America, Inc., 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993) (refusing to 
reconsider a petition for rehearing of the panel holding that an electronic robot 
who bore an uncanny similarity to Vanna White violated her “right of 
publicity”); Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 
959 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that parody trading cards didn’t infringe on 
players’ “rights of publicity”); Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 
1180 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that a magazine’s use of a photo of Hoffman 
digitally altered to create an image of him wearing a designer’s brand of 
clothing was not pure commercial speech and so was entitled to full protection 
of the First Amendment; thus, it did not violate Hoffman’s “right of publicity”); 
and Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 
2001) (creating the “transformative elements” test).  ETW, 332 F.3d at 931-36. 
 119. ETW, 332 F.3d at 934-36 (discussing Comedy III, 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 
2001)). 
 120. Id. at 936. 
 121. 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 122. 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1995). 
 123. 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 124. ETW, 332 F.3d at 936. 
 125. Id. 
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Applying these principles to Rush’s work itself, the court 
first stated that “[t]he evidence in the record reveals that 
Rush’s work consists of much more than a mere literal likeness 
of Woods”, and that the artistic elements in the work were 
enough to entitle Rush’s work to First Amendment 
protection.126  Next, applying the Restatement (Third) of Unfair 
Competition, the ETW court concluded that “Rush’s work has 
substantial informational and creative content which 
outweighs any adverse effect on ETW’s market.”127  Further 
finding that Rush’s work was “entitled to the full protection of 
the First Amendment”,128 the court used the balancing test 
employed by Cardtoons L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players 
Association129 to conclude that the degree of the restriction on 
speech in this case was greater than Woods’s intellectual 
property right, since “Woods, like most sports and 
entertainment celebrities with commercially valuable 
identities” would “still be able to reap substantial financial 
rewards from authorized appearances and endorsements”, even 
without the right of publicity.130  “It is not at all clear”, the 
court stated, “that the appearance of Woods’s likeness in 
artwork prints which display one of his major achievements 
will reduce the commercial value of his likeness.”131  By 
contrast, Rush supplemented Woods’s identity with an 
important creative contribution of his own; by refusing Rush 
protection, the court would “extinguish [his] right to profit from 
his creative enterprise.”132 
Finally, turning to the transformative elements test used 
in Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc.,133 the 
court found that: 
 Rush’s work does contain significant transformative elements which 
make it especially worthy of First Amendment protection and also 
less likely to interfere with the economic interest protected by 
Woods’s right of publicity.  Unlike the unadorned, nearly 
 
 126. Id.  The court poetically noted that “[a] piece of art that portrays a 
historic sporting event communicates and celebrates the value our culture 
attaches to such events.  It would be ironic indeed if the presence of the image 
of the victorious athlete would deny the work First Amendment protection.”  
Id. 
 127. Id. at 937. 
 128. Id. 
 129. 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996). 
 130. ETW, 332 F.3d at 937-38 
 131. Id. at 938. 
 132. Id. 
 133. 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001). 
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photographic reproduction of the faces of The Three Stooges in 
Comedy III, Rush’s work does not capitalize solely on a literal 
depiction of Woods.  Rather, Rush’s work consists of a collage of 
images in addition to Woods’s image which are combined to describe, 
in artistic form, a historic event in sports history and to convey a 
message about the significance of Woods’s achievement in that event.  
Because Rush’s work has substantial transformative elements, it is 
entitled to the full protection of the First Amendment.  In this case, 
we find that Woods’s right of publicity must yield to the First 
Amendment.134 
Based on these conclusions, the court affirmed summary 
judgment to Jireh Publishing.135 
III. THE “TRANSFORMATIVE ELEMENTS” TEST IS A 
WORKABLE SOLUTION 
Despite the criticism of the “transformative elements” test 
established in Comedy III, the test is essentially workable for 
three reasons: (1) it strikes a correct balance between the right 
of publicity and First Amendment rights; (2) it allows courts to 
make necessary fact specific determinations; and (3) other 
alternative approaches do not offer any improvements; on the 
contrary, they may be even more faulty.  However, it is likely 
that the confusing and disjointed nature of the ETW decision 
will be used as proof that the “transformative elements” test 
should not be applied by future courts.  Yet the “transformative 
elements” test is not to blame for the weaknesses of the ETW 
decision: poor organization, the failure to address the issues 
raised, and a lack of sufficient guidance regarding the 
definition of the Ohio right of publicity are at fault.  By 
following a clear cut, step by step approach, the ETW court 
could have avoided these pitfalls and focused on a more 
thorough examination of Rush’s work under the 
“transformative elements” test.  Future courts can do the same 
and in the process provide better insight into the true strengths 
and weaknesses of the “transformative elements” test. 
A. THE “TRANSFORMATIVE ELEMENTS” TEST ESTABLISHED IN 
COMEDY III IS ESSENTIALLY WORKABLE 
While the “transformative elements” test established in 
Comedy III has been heavily criticized, it is essentially 
workable.  Not only does the test strike the appropriate balance 
between the celebrity’s interests and artist’s rights, but it 
 
 134. ETW, 332 F.3d at 938. 
 135. Id. 
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leaves room for courts to make the fact specific determinations 
necessary to ensure fair results in unavoidably subjective 
decisions.  In addition, the alternatives proposed up to this 
point do not offer realistic suggestions for either increasing 
clarity or decreasing subjectivity in court decisions; nor do they 
address the significant economic benefits that celebrities 
receive from some unauthorized use of their identities.  
Together, these three reasons provide sufficient justification for 
applying the “transformative elements” test to cases, such as 
Comedy III and ETW, where the right of publicity intersects 
with the First Amendment. 
1. The “Transformative Elements” Test Strikes the Right 
Balance 
Considering the questionable strength of the rationales for 
a right of publicity,136 the Comedy III court struck the correct 
balance between a celebrity’s right of publicity and an artist’s 
First Amendment rights when formulating the “transformative 
elements” test.  A celebrity’s right of publicity is primarily 
based on economic justifications.137  How much their economic 
interests, and thus their publicity rights, should be protected 
should be premised on how important economic incentives are 
to the celebrity.138  While one can hardly discount the 
significant investment a celebrity makes in herself, “fame pre-
existed the right of publicity and no one apparently needed the 
law’s protection to become famous before this century.”139  In 
addition, it is likely that some unauthorized use of a celebrity’s 
identity increases, rather than decreases, the celebrity’s 
value.140  Concerns about “over exploitation” and “unjust 
enrichment” only become relevant when an artist’s or author’s 
use of the celebrity’s identity misappropriates or directly 
competes with the celebrity’s own use, “without being 
 
 136. See supra notes 23-46 and accompanying text. 
 137. See supra notes 23-46 and accompanying text. 
 138. In de Grandpré, supra note 27, de Grandpré asserts that the current 
rules governing a right of publicity are overbroad, and that “efficient rules of 
right of publicity infringement should prevent the over-exploitation of 
celebrity identity while at the same time encouraging communicative uses 
that produce greater positive externalities than negative ones.”  Id. at 108.  
This comment suggests that the “transformative elements” test fulfills Mr. de 
Grandpré’s requirements. 
 139. de Grandpré, supra note 27, at 103. 
 140. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
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transformative.”141 
The “transformative elements” test recognizes this by 
narrowing the number of situations in which a celebrity can 
claim a violation of the right of publicity.  While the first prong 
of the test focuses on the artistic elements of a work, the 
“subsidiary prong” expressly urges that a court take account of 
the economic justifications for the right of publicity.142  In doing 
so, the test preserves the right of a celebrity to receive 
compensation if an artist simply takes a celebrity’s identity and 
uses it without contributing more than “trivial” artistic content 
or ideas, where the artist’s “creativity, skill, and reputation”143 
do not add to the work.  In such a case, the bare use of the 
celebrity’s investment without any additional contribution 
amounts to almost a taking, since it is the celebrity’s 
investment alone that is being used.  People viewing and 
buying the artwork will tire of the celebrity more quickly, since 
the only thing being portrayed in the artwork is the celebrity 
himself. 
By contrast, an artist who has met the celebrity’s 
investment with his or her own contribution by adding 
expression separate from the celebrity’s identity is protected 
under the “transformative elements” test.  Considering the 
questionable economic justifications for the right to publicity, 
this result seems to be fair.  It is less likely that artists who 
 
 141. See de Grandpré, supra note 27, at 116-17.  de Grandpré suggests that 
an efficient right of publicity would “prohibit unauthorized uses of identity 
that harm it—that result in net negative externalities—but would allow 
unauthorized uses that result in net positive externalities—informative or 
recoding uses, for example.”  Id. at 114.  The most inefficient uses of publicity 
are “[u]nauthorized deceptive uses of persona . . . [since they] have no social 
value and cause significant injury to a celebrity, especially if she has already 
endorsed goods or services in related markets.”  Id. at 117.  “[U]ses of persona 
in circumstances that are shocking or repulsive also result in near immediate 
harm, and should be considered deceptive” and violative of a right of publicity.  
Id.  In addition, “unauthorized reproductions of performances [should] also 
remain right of publicity infringements because they directly compete with a 
performer’s business, while the social benefit of copied performances is limited 
if the defendant does not improve on the plaintiff’s act.”  Id.  By contrast, “uses 
that trigger curiosity rather than fatigue usually do not result in congestion 
externalities.  Id. at 117-18.  Moreover, informative uses often entail high 
transaction costs because it is notoriously difficult to make consumers pay for 
the information”  Id. 
 142. Comedy III Prod., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 810 (Cal. 
2001) (stating that “courts may find useful a subsidiary inquiry, particularly 
in close cases: does the marketability and economic value of the challenged 
work derive primarily from the fame of the celebrity depicted?”). 
 143. Id. 
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incorporate more than “trivial” content or ideas will be unjustly 
enriched, since they have had to make an investment in the 
artwork as well, whether it is through their own thoughts, 
talents, or “reputation” as an artist.  In fact, the artist’s effort 
may even unjustly enrich the celebrity.  It is entirely possible 
that the artist’s use of the celebrity’s identity will increase, 
rather than decrease, the popularity of the celebrity by adding 
to the number of people who recognize the celebrity and what 
he or she does.144  In addition, a celebrity whose personal 
identity plays a minor role in a piece of artwork should not be 
as concerned about over-exploitation, since it is as likely that 
someone will purchase the artwork for the art itself as it is that 
he or she will purchase the art for the celebrity image thereon.  
Thus, any economic incentives the celebrity has to perform or 
create are not threatened by the use of his or her identity in 
such a situation. 
2. The “Transformative Elements” Test Allows for a Fact-
Specific Inquiry 
Cases dealing with art, music, and related pursuits are 
inevitably unique and fact-intensive.  The “transformative 
elements” test provides a workable solution in such cases 
because it allows courts to make case-by-case determinations 
on the contribution(s) of authors to the specific piece of art at 
issue.  While the test implicates a minimal amount of 
subjectivity, such subjectivity is unavoidable and not 
necessarily undesirable.  In fact, it may enhance the quality of 
court decisions by avoiding the confusion and possible 
unfairness that could result from bright line rules that attempt 
to squeeze diverse fact situations into the same, ill-fitting 
mold.145 
While some commentators have criticized the 
“transformative elements” test for being too vague146 and 
allowing too much subjectivity in judgment,147 this subjectivity 
 
 144. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text. 
 145. It is almost impossible to use a one-size-fits-all objective standard to 
judge such diverse works as paintings, sculptures, television and radios 
advertisements, web pages, etc.  Our recent experience in attempting to merge 
new internet technology into the existing statutory regime (both in copyright 
and patent law) is just one example of the difficulties inherent in attempting 
to reconcile diverse forms of creativity under the same standards. 
 146. Peles, supra note 12, at 549. 
 147. See supra text accompanying note 79. 
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is probably an inevitable result, considering the subject matter 
to which the test is applied.  Courts have attempted to make so-
called “objective” decisions in cases involving artwork for 
decades, with mixed results.148  Judges and juries have tastes, 
preferences, and opinions.  Art appeals to these different tastes, 
preferences, and opinions in different ways.  Instead of hiding 
behind a bright line rule with an illusory promise of objectivity, 
the “transformative elements” test rightly recognizes that that 
a minimal amount of subjective judgment will be involved in 
court cases involving art, music, writing and related pursuits.  
It puts the parties on notice that a court will be considering 
whether an artist has contributed something other than just a 
literal depiction of a celebrity to the world of art. 
Related is the idea that art depicting celebrities comes in 
many forms.  Likewise, the “expression” that adds a 
“transformative element” to the art can take many forms.  The 
“transformative elements” test recognizes these differences by 
leaving the definition of “transformative elements” open so that 
future courts will be able to tailor its meaning to the facts of 
each individual case.149  It is hardly unwise to do so, 
considering that art and its “elements” can encompass an 
infinite type and amount of expression limited only by the 
 
 148. Such difficulties have occurred in reference to the determination of 
originality, a constitutional prerequisite to protection in copyright law.  
Compare Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 60 (1984) 
(stating that a photograph of Oscar Wilde is a “useful, new, harmonious, 
characteristic, and graceful picture, and that said plaintiff made the same . . . 
entirely from his own original mental conception, to which he gave visible form 
by posing the said Oscar Wilde in front of the camera” and therefore holding 
that the photograph was “an original work of art, the product of plaintiff’s 
intellectual invention” for which copyright protection was available and 
violated in this case) with Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 
F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951) (stating that “‘[o]riginal’ in reference to a 
copyrighted work means that the particular work ‘owes its origin’ to the 
‘author.’  No large measure of novelty is necessary”); and Bridgeman Art 
Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 191, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (stating 
that “‘slavish copying,’ although doubtless requiring technical effort, does not” 
entitle a work to copyright protection); and Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural 
Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (holding that “[o]riginal, as 
the term is used in copyright, means only that the work was independently 
created by the author (as opposed to copied form other works), and that it 
possess at least some minimal degree of creativity”). 
 149. Comedy III, 21 P.3d 797, 809 (Cal. 2001).  The Comedy III court 
emphasized that “transformative elements or creative contributions that 
require First Amendment protection are not confined to parody and can take 
many forms, from factual reporting . . . to fictionalized portrayal . . . to subtle 
social criticism [citations omitted].”  Id. 
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imagination of the human mind.  In doing so, the test avoids 
the unfairness that could result if it set forth specific factors or 
requirements that would be binding on future courts.  Since the 
world of art is incredibly diverse, it is likely that any test that 
places artwork into categories, or subjects it to specific 
requirements, or requires that it meet certain factors, thereby 
preventing a court from delving into the content of the art, 
would itself cause unfair results. 
Traditionally, however, the fear of integrating subjectivity 
into court decisions has, at least on the surface, caused courts 
to staunchly oppose standards that recognize the use of any 
subjective judgments.150  However, there is nothing inherently 
wrong with making subjective judgments; judges and juries 
make them often.151  What is dangerous is failing to recognize 
 
 150. The most famous opinion cited in support of this idea is that of Justice 
Holmes in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903).  The 
“Bleistein Non Discrimination Principle” was stated in the copyright 
infringement case as such: 
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the 
law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial 
illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.  At the 
one extreme, some works of genius would be sure to miss 
appreciation . . . At the other end, copyright would be denied to 
pictures which appealed to a public less educated than the judge.  Yet 
if they command the interest of any public, they have a commercial 
value- it would be bold to say that they have not an aesthetic and 
educational value- and the taste of any public is not to be treated with 
contempt. 
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903). 
 151. See Julia Reytblat, Is Originality in Copyright Law a “Question of 
Law” or a “Question of Fact?”: The Fact Solution, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. 
L.J. 181, 185-86 (1999) (stating that “[c]ourts have wrestled with defining and 
measuring creativity, usually with little success, for over hundred years.  
Several specialized approaches have emerged, all of which are extremely 
subjective”).  Reytblat explains these specialized approaches, which 
correspond to different types of protected works.  The first approach is the 
Feist test for evaluating originality in compilations.  Feist requires that there 
be a “collection of pre existing material facts or data,” that “the data must be 
selected, coordinated or arranged,” and that “by virtue of such selection, 
coordination, or arrangement, an original work of authorship must be 
created.”  Id. at 187-88.  While the court in Feist did not list the types of 
organization that would pass the creativity test, according to Reytblat, “it did 
say that the structure chosen must be a product of choice that reflects ‘the 
existence of . . . intellectual production, of thought, and conception.’”  Id. at 
188 (citing Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 
340, 348, 362 (1991)).  The second area Reytblat looks at is “derivative works.”  
In this area a court must decide whether the “quantity and quality of the 
author’s contributions” constitute “sufficient minimal creativity to merit 
copyright protection.”  Id. at 190.  To determine this, courts often use the 
“distinguishable variation” test, in which “an author claiming ownership of a 
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subjectivity and appropriately constraining it.152  As set forth 
by the Comedy III court, the “transformative elements” test is 
appropriately constrained: courts are “not to be concerned with 
the quality of the artistic contribution—vulgar forms of 
expression fully qualify for First Amendment protection”153 and 
the “inquiry is [intended to be] more quantitative than 
qualitative, asking whether the literal and imitative or the 
creative elements predominate in the work.”154 The “subsidiary 
inquiry” constrains judgment even further, asking courts to 
consider “in close cases” where the “economic value of the 
challenged work derive[s] . . . from.”155  While none of these 
 
valid copyright in a derivative work must point out the variations he has 
made, and then allow the court to determine if those variations are 
‘distinguishable,’ rather than ‘merely trivial.’”  Id. at 191 (citing Russ 
VerSteeg, Rethinking Originality, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 801, 846 (1993)).  
Finally, Reytblat explains a test relied on by Judge (now Justice) Ginsburg in 
Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 888 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1989) to “measure 
creativity in truly ‘original’ works of authorship, those that are neither 
derivative works nor compilations.”  Id. at 192.  Reytblat states that Ginsburg 
“relied upon an instinctive or subjective judgment of a work, based on one’s 
experience of the world” in finding that the “selection and rearrangement of 
common shapes demonstrated a minimal element of ingenuity heretofore 
unseen” and so gave Atari copyright in its video game “Breakout.”  Id. at 193-
94.  The district court had held that the Register of Copyrights was correct in 
refusing to register the game because of lack of originality, since the game 
“consisted of nothing more than an aggregation of common geometric shapes 
and colors.”  Id. at 193 (citing Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 888 F.2d 878, 883 
(D.C. Cir. 1989)). 
Reytblat further states that “originality is inexorably linked to the communal 
perception of what is artistic, imaginative or inventive.”  Id. at 196.  This 
carries over into other areas of the law: “like originality, these three issues 
[trademark infringement, the “reasonableness of conduct in tort law,” and 
“[s]ubstantial similarity in copyright law”] are invariably subjective and are 
firmly tied to community standards, to what the community views as being 
reasonable, confusing, or pilfered.  These determinations call for subjective 
judgments based on peoples’ experiences and perceptions of the world.”  Id. at 
197. 
It should be noted that Reytblat argues that because judgments in copyright 
law and other areas of intellectual property are so subjective, they should be 
left to juries, not judges.  This comment reserves judgment on that issue for 
other researchers and only notes that Reytblat’s arguments support the idea 
that judges and juries are called on to make subjective judgments regularly. 
 152. If one relies on the belief that courts are making entirely objective 
determinations, it is likely that he or she will fail to set boundaries to 
constrain that judgment.  By recognizing the fact that all judgments are 
inherently subjective, one can tie in factors that guide a court’s judgment in 
order to increase predictability and consistency. 
 153. Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 809. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 810. 
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considerations will provide a rule that allows parties to 
determine their fate with one hundred percent accuracy, they 
do ensure that judges and juries cannot make determinations 
based on their personal opinions of the artist, artwork, or 
celebrity. 
3.  Alternative Tests Do Not Provide Appropriate Substitutes 
Two main alternatives to the “transformative elements” 
test have been proposed: the Cultural Niche Theory of Art and 
the copyright “Fair Use” defense.156  While each of these tests 
has their benefits, neither is an appropriate substitute for the 
“transformative elements” test. 
a. The Cultural Niche Theory of Art 
The Cultural Niche Theory of Art is not an appropriate 
substitute for the “transformative elements” test because it 
fails to eliminate the subjectivity.  In addition, while the 
“transformative elements” test recognizes the relatively weak 
economic justifications behind the right of publicity, the 
Cultural Niche Theory of Art dispenses with them altogether, 
creating a situation where the most egregious violations of 
celebrities’ economic rights may go un-remedied, while small 
ones may be punished. 
Proponents of the Cultural Niche Theory assert that the 
test removes some of the subjectivity of the “transformative 
elements” test by placing works into either the “Popular Art” 
category or the “Fine Art” category, with protection being given 
to “Fine Art.”157  However, upon close examination, one comes 
to the realization that the line between what is “Popular Art” 
and “Fine Art” is blurred and subjective as well.  For example, 
the Cultural Niche Theory asks the finder of fact to determine 
whether a work’s purpose is to “entertain, to stimulate emotion 
or project sentimentality” (evidence suggesting “Popular Art”) 
or to “exhibit a personal expression, originality, [or] creativity” 
(evidence suggesting “Fine Art”).158  First and foremost, it 
seems that the two categories are not mutually exclusive.  In 
addition, one must ask how judges and juries can be expected 
to make such a decision without consulting their own ideas 
about entertainment, emotion, and sentimentality.  
 
 156. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text. 
 157. See supra text accompanying note 82. 
 158. See supra text accompanying note 82. 
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Furthermore, the Cultural Niche Theory requires the fact 
finder to classify something as “Popular Art” based on what is 
“conventional” or “familiar”.159  This classification, as well, 
ultimately depends on what is “conventional” or “familiar” to a 
particular person and necessarily requires judges and juries to 
consult their own ideas and opinions. 
Since it fails to recognize the subjectivity inherent in these 
questions, the Cultural Niche Theory fails to constrain it.160  
The Cultural Niche Theory invites judges and juries to decide 
what “entertains” or is “familiar” to them, without setting 
guidelines regarding offensive materials or suggesting 
additional factors that may be considered in borderline cases.  
Thus, the Cultural Niche Theory may actually be more 
subjective and possibly more dangerous than the 
“transformative elements” test. 
The Cultural Niche Theory is also faulty because it may 
protect art that significantly infringes on a celebrity’s economic 
right, but condemn art that results in only minimal conversion.  
This discrepancy completely ignores the unjust enrichment 
justification behind the right of publicity.  If an artist created a 
one-of-a-kind, original painting depicting the exact replica of a 
celebrity, for example—a president, and sold it at an art sale 
for one million dollars, the work would be fully protected if the 
distinction between “Fine Art” and “Popular Art” is applied as 
suggested.161  However, if the artist created a small playing 
card out of this same painting and then made and sold 50,000 
copies for one dollar each, the playing cards would be 
considered “Popular Art” and thus not protected.162  While the 
 
 159. See supra text accompanying note 82. 
 160. See supra text accompanying note 82. 
 161. Under the characteristics of “fine art”, noted supra text accompanying 
note 82, a realistic painting of the president’s likeness is likely to be 
considered “fine art.”  In his article, The Three Stooges Latest Act: Attempting 
to Define the Scope of Protection the First Amendment provides to Works of Art 
Depicting Celebrities, Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Saderup, Inc., Singer 
uses the example of the Mona Lisa to illustrate fine art.  See Singer, supra 
note 78.  The Mona Lisa is a work of “fine art,” he states, because its value 
“arguably lies in its aesthetic form, its expression, its creative uniqueness or 
its appeal to intellect and reason of the mind.  Id.  More importantly, the 
Mona Lisa is valued as an original, one-of-a-kind work of Fine Art.”  Id. at 334.  
A similar, expensive, one of a kind portrait of the president could be 
considered analogous. 
 162. Under the characteristics of “popular art”, noted supra text 
accompanying note 82, such an item would almost certainly be considered 
popular art, since playing cards are inexpensive, marketed in venues where 
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celebrity may suffer greater damage in the form of over-
exposure via the 50,000 playing cards, the case for preventing 
unjust enrichment of the artist would be much greater with the 
one-of-a-kind original painting.163  Arguably, this creates an 
unfair result for both the celebrity, who suffers greater damage 
from the protected work, and the artist, whose small-scale work 
is prejudiced by the fact that it appeals to a number of people 
whose art budget is limited to a one dollar playing card. 
The “transformative elements” test avoids this problem by 
premising the distinction between protected and unprotected 
expression on the subject of the art itself and then considering 
where the economic value of the artwork comes from.164  In our 
example above, the artist will be prevented from being unjustly 
enriched, since the test ensures that the artist has contributed 
something to the work and that the value of the work is not 
 
the greatest number of people have access to them, and many copies of them 
can be distributed, all of relatively equal value because of their unoriginality 
or lack of uniqueness. 
 163. Hypothetically, more people would undoubtedly have access to seeing 
and obtaining a playing card than a one-of-a-kind million dollar painting.  
However, if we assume that the celebrity would ask for a twenty five percent 
cut on all the earnings of either type of artwork, the one of a kind, original 
work protected by the Cultural Niche theory is doing the greatest damage to 
the celebrity economically by denying him or her this cut.  Furthermore, if the 
painting is famous enough, it is possible that potential for over-exposure could 
even be greater with the one-of-a-kind painting than with the playing cards. 
 164. Recall that the test requests a court to consider whether “the celebrity 
likeness is one of the ‘raw materials’ from which an original work is 
synthesized, or whether the depiction or imitation of the celebrity is the very 
sum and substance of the work in question . . . whether a product containing a 
celebrity’s likeness is so transformed that it has become primarily the 
defendant’s own expression rather than the celebrity’s likeness.”  Comedy III 
Prod., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 809 (Cal. 2001).  A court is then 
requested to consider whether the “marketability and economic value of the 
challenged work derive[s] primarily from the fame of the celebrity depicted.”  
Id. at 810.  Under this test, one cannot be sure whether a court would protect 
the one-of-a-kind painting, but under the marketability prong, if the large 
economic value of this painting is due to the celebrity’s own fame, it would go 
against the idea that the painting should be protected by the First 
Amendment.  This gives greater protection to a celebrity whose rights have 
truly been infringed, since a celebrity can suffer economic loss from either 
expensive or inexpensive items.  Likewise, one cannot be sure that a court 
would not protect the playing cards; yet, again, under the marketability and 
economic value prong, a court must determine whether the value of the cards 
is rightfully due to the celebrity.  The fine art/popular art test, by placing so 
much emphasis on the expense and venue of the art, misses the factor that 
matters most: whether the celebrity is due part of the proceeds from the item; 
whether expensive or inexpensive; in a museum or a convenience store; 
because he or she is the reason the article is of value. 
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solely due to the celebrity’s fame.  The expense and distribution 
of the work makes no difference; it is the content of the work 
itself that matters. 
b. Copyright’s Fair Use Defense 
Scholars have also suggested that importing the entire fair 
use defense from copyright law will provide a more clear and 
predictable test in right of publicity cases.  However, “the 
factors used in copyright analysis do not readily lend 
themselves to right of publicity” claims165 and might result in 
overprotecting a celebrity’s right of publicity. 
The first major problem with using the fair use factors is 
that right of publicity does not correctly fit the paradigm.  As 
Mark Lee notes: 
 [The first] copyright fair use factor[], the ‘nature of the copyrighted 
work,’ would generally not be helpful in right of publicity analysis 
because the identity rights involved would usually be of the same 
‘nature.’  Another factor, ‘the amount and substantiality of the portion 
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole,’ also would not 
generally be meaningful, since by definition there must be a taking of 
an individual’s identity before right of publicity liability attaches.  A 
third factor, ‘the effect of the use upon the potential market for or 
value of the copyrighted work,’ would routinely favor a finding of 
infringement, as Supreme Court authority establishes that an 
uncompensated taking will generally have an adverse effect on the 
market for commercial exploitation of the celebrity’s image.166 
Lee highlights the second major problem with using the 
fair use standard in right of publicity cases: the third factor in 
the fair use standard will almost always fall in favor of finding 
a violation of a right to publicity.167  Since one factor is almost 
certainly determined against artists from the outset, they face 
what is effectively a presumption of infringement.  Yet tipping 
the balance against the artists does not make sense.  Not only 
are they arguably asserting the more important right in such 
cases, the First Amendment right, but the “presumption” fails 
to take account of an important difference between the right of 
publicity and copyright.  While copyrights are limited in 
duration, many courts have held that the right of publicity 
exists posthumously and is both inheritable and devisable, 
without regard to time limits.168  In order to preserve the 
balance between the right of the artist and the original author 
 
 165. Lee, supra note 19, at 492. 
 166. Id. 
 167. See id. 
 168. 62A AM. JUR. 2D Privacy § 25 (2003). 
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or celebrity, it would seem that the right of publicity should 
have broader exceptions than the fair use defense permits in 
copyright to offset the greater temporal protection it offers.  Yet 
by simply applying the fair use factors to the right of publicity, 
one is narrowing the scope of the right without compensating 
for the fact that the right of the celebrity likely exists in 
perpetuity. 
The “transformative elements” test adopted in Comedy III 
is thus workable.  The test appropriately balances the right of 
publicity and the First Amendment, and allows courts the 
flexibility to make necessary fact specific determinations.  
Furthermore, the main alternatives to the test do not hold up 
under scrutiny.  Yet the future of the “transformative elements” 
test depends on the ability of courts to correctly apply it.  As 
noted below, for the ETW court, the application of this 
workable standard appeared to be a challenge. 
B. THE ETW V. JIREH DECISION THREATENS THE FUTURE 
APPLICABILITY OF THE “TRANSFORMATIVE ELEMENTS” TEST 
The Sixth Circuit, in ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, 
Inc.,169 was the next court to utilize the “transformative 
elements” test after the Comedy III decision.  While the 
“transformative elements” test is essentially workable, a person 
reading the ETW decision may have serious doubts about the 
standard’s future.  A closer look, however, reveals that it is not 
the test itself that makes the ETW decision confusing and 
unclear.  The ETW court, while ultimately reaching a correct 
decision, encountered a number of problems when attempting 
to explain its reasoning.  First and foremost, the very structure 
of the analysis does not lend itself easily to clarity.170  Second, 
the court appears to break the right of publicity decision into 
three inquiries, but it fails to directly address the issues it 
presents.  Third, the court’s analysis was made more difficult 
by the fact that it was working with common law, not a broad 
statute as in Comedy III.171  Finally, incorporating the 
comments accompanying a Restatement in its right of publicity 
definition led the court to overlook the fact that the 
“transformative elements” test was intended to be an 
 
 169. 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 170. See infra Part III.B.1.a. 
 171. See infra Part III.B.1.c. 
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affirmative defense.172  These four problems, not the 
“transformative elements” test, are what complicated a fairly 
straightforward decision.  By clarifying the structure of the 
decision, addressing the major issues it set out to analyze, and 
abandoning the Restatement comments as part of the Ohio 
right of publicity, the court could have avoided considerable 
confusion and focused instead on a clear, concise analysis under 
the “transformative elements” test.  The ETW decision perhaps 
then could have provided better guidance to future courts on 
how to apply the “transformative elements” test and given 
future courts and litigants a more accurate picture of the test’s 
true value.173 
1. The ETW v. Jireh Decision Regarding the Right of Publicity 
Is Confusing and Unclear, But This Confusion Is Not Due to 
the “Transformative Elements” Test 
In reading the Court’s right of publicity decision in ETW, 
one can spot four major problems: the court uses an 
inappropriate structure to tackle the problem, it fails to answer 
the questions it asks, the necessary use of Ohio common law, as 
opposed to statutory law, made the analysis more complex, and 
the court’s use of the Restatement and accompanying 
comments to determine whether Woods had a right of publicity 
led it to ignore the fact that the “transformative elements” test 
was intended to be an affirmative defense. 
a. The Structure of the Court’s Analysis Was Inappropriate 
In dealing with the numerous claims brought by ETW in 
this case, the Sixth Circuit attempted to separate them into 
logical categories for explanation and analysis.  Under section 
IV, titled “Lanham Act Unfair Competition and False 
Endorsement Claims, Ohio’s Right to Privacy Claims, and the 
First Amendment Defense”, the court first talked about First 
Amendment defenses in general, quickly analyzed whether the 
First Amendment applies to Rush’s work, and then explained 
the Lanham Act claims and right of publicity claims, all in 
separate, clearly labeled sections.174  It then attempted to apply 
 
 172. See infra Part III.B.1.d. 
 173. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 174. See ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g., Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 924-36 (6th Cir. 
2003). 
JASMER FORMATTED 05/12/2004  12:55 PM 
326 MINNESOTA INTEL. PROPERTY REVIEW [Vol. 5:2 
 
the law that it just explained in one large section.175  The court 
moved with lightning speed from the Lanham Act claim to the 
right of publicity claim and mixed more First Amendment 
application in with each.176 
This structure leads to considerable confusion.  The court 
painstakingly explained the law in each area but then failed to 
apply it as carefully.  The decision reads as if the court 
suddenly became tired of thinking about the issues and 
uncomfortably penned a string of conclusions as fast as possible 
to get rid of the case.  By using cases and analysis from the 
right of publicity explanation in the Lanham Act analysis, and 
vice versa, the reader begins to wonder just where the 
application of Lanham Act principles ends and the application 
of the right of publicity principles begins.177  The First 
Amendment defense explanation and short application at the 
beginning of the decision178 and then subsequent application of 
the First Amendment defense intermittently throughout the 
Lanham Act and right of publicity analyses179 leaves the reader 
confused about which First Amendment principles apply to the 
facts.  This frustrates the reader and fails to separate clearly 
the important issues implicated by the right of publicity long 
before the “transformative elements” test is applied. 
b. The Court Fails to Address the Issues It Poses 
The second major problem with the ETW v. Jireh decision 
is that the court fails to answer directly the questions it asks.  
The ETW court appears to be attempting to break the right of 
publicity issue into three basic inquiries: (1) Was Woods’s right 
of publicity violated?; (2) If so, does the First Amendment apply 
to Rush’s painting?; and finally (3) If the First Amendment 
does apply, do Rush’s First Amendment rights trump Woods’s 
right of publicity under the “transformative elements” test?180  
The substance and order of these questions is logical.  The 
Comedy III court intended the “transformative elements” test 
to be an affirmative defense,181 so it only makes sense that a 
 
 175. See id. at 936-38. 
 176. See id. at 924-38. 
 177. See id. 
 178. See id. at 924-25. 
 179. See id. at 925-36. 
 180. See id. at 936. 
 181. See Comedy III Prod., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 810 
(Cal. 2001) (“In sum, when an artist is faced with a right of publicity challenge 
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court first ask whether there was actually a violation, second 
consider whether a First Amendment defense is available at 
all, and finally take that defense and apply it to the facts at 
hand. 
However, the court does not directly discuss the answers to 
these questions but engages in a prolonged discussion of 
balancing, precedent, and other tangential issues.  As the 
dissent notes, “it appears that the majority engages in three 
separate analyses, and arrives at three separate holdings, 
although all of which reach the same result”182 and does so 
independently of one another.  The first conclusion the court 
draws is that Rush’s work does not violate Woods’s right of 
publicity since “Rush’s work has substantial informational and 
creative content which outweighs any adverse effect on ETW’s 
market.”183  The court then goes on to discuss whether the First 
Amendment applies to Rush’s work.184  Yet this question is 
already answered in the preliminary discussion about First 
Amendment defenses when the court stated “Rush’s prints are 
not commercial speech.  They do not propose a commercial 
transaction.  Accordingly, they are entitled to the full 
protection of the First Amendment.”185  Instead of simply 
stating this concept, the court discusses the balance between 
the restriction placed on Rush and the interest of Woods.186  At 
this point, one begins to question the purpose of the prior First 
Amendment discussion.  The answer to whether Rush’s work is 
entitled to full protection of the First Amendment apparently 
re-surfaces a few paragraphs later, but neither the analysis nor 
the conclusion match up with the question that was originally 
 
to his or her work, he or she may raise as affirmative defense that the work is 
protected by the First Amendment inasmuch as it contains significant 
transformative elements or that the value of the work does not derive 
primarily from the celebrity’s fame”). 
 182. ETW, 332 F.3d at 951 (Clay, J., dissenting). 
 183. Id. at 937. 
 184. See id. at 937-38.  The court expressly states that “Rush’s work does 
not violate Woods’s right of publicity.”  Id. at 937.  One would think that this is 
the end of the story, since if Woods’s right of publicity has not been violated, 
then there is no cause of action, hence, no liability.  Yet the beginning of the 
next sentence continues with the analysis: “We further find that Rush’s work 
is expression which is entitled to the full protection of the First Amendment.”  
Id. at 937.  Note that there is no language indicating that this is an 
alternative argument but is a continuation of the prior analysis. 
 185. Id. at 925. 
 186. See id. at 937-38. 
JASMER FORMATTED 05/12/2004  12:55 PM 
328 MINNESOTA INTEL. PROPERTY REVIEW [Vol. 5:2 
 
asked.187  The court finally ends its First Amendment analysis 
by stating that “the effect of limiting Woods’s right of publicity 
in this case is negligible and significantly outweighed by 
society’s interest in freedom of artistic expression”;188 but the 
balancing here was neither necessary nor relevant to the issue 
of whether Rush’s work was entitled to full First Amendment 
protection. 
Finally, the court announced it would apply the 
“transformative elements” test to the facts at hand.189  In a 
single, brief paragraph, it looked at the first prong of the test 
and then simply stated that because the work has substantial 
“transformative elements” it is entitled to First Amendment 
protection.190 
As described, none of the answers to the questions the 
court originally set out to ask are directly on point.  The only 
inquiry that the court provides a direct response to is whether 
 
 187. Id..  The court says originally that it is considering whether Rush’s 
work “is entitled to the full protection of First Amendment and not the more 
limited protection afforded to commercial speech.”  Id. at 937.  It then notes 
that “[w]hen we balance the magnitude of the speech restriction against the 
interest in protecting Woods’s intellectual property right, we encounter 
precisely the same considerations weighed by the Tenth Circuit in Cardtoons.”  
Id.  However, the Cardtoons court explicitly stated that it was applying a 
balancing test to determine “whether Cardtoons’ First Amendment right 
trumps [Major League Baseball’s] property right,” and did so only after it had 
already discussed and concluded that the trading cards at issue in the case 
were not commercial and were subject to the full protection of the First 
Amendment.  See Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 
F.3d 959, 970 (10th Cir. 1996).  The ETW court’s analysis is thus directed at 
the wrong question. 
 188. ETW, 332 F.3d at 938.  In essence, the ETW court was applying a test 
that was supposed to be replaced by the “transformative elements” test.  
Neither the Cardtoons test nor the “transformative elements” test has 
anything to do with whether Rush’s work was entitled to the full protection of 
the First Amendment. 
 189. ETW, 332 F.3d at 938. 
 190. Id.  The court only goes so far as to state that “Rush’s work does not 
capitalize solely on a literal depiction of Woods . . . [but] consists of a collage of 
images . . . which are combined to describe, in artistic form, a historic event in 
sports history and to convey a message about the significance of Woods’s 
achievement in that event.”  Id.  It does not specifically address whether the 
“marketability and economic value of the challenged work derives primarily 
from the fame” of Tiger Woods or whether the “creativity, skill, and 
reputation” of Rush gives it greater value.  See Comedy III Prod., Inc. v. Gary 
Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d at 810.  In doing so, the court misses the point behind 
the subsidiary prong: evaluation the economic harm to the celebrity, in 
proportion to the amount of the work that can be said to be rightfully 
“his/hers.”  See id. 
JASMER FORMATTED 05/12/2004  12:55 PM 
2004] A WORKABLE STANDARD 329 
 
Woods’s right of publicity is violated.  However, it does so by 
engaging in a balancing approach that would be better 
addressed by the “transformative elements” analysis.  If the 
court is correct in stating that Woods’s right of publicity is not 
violated, the decision should be over.191  Confusion abounds, 
then, when the question of whether the First Amendment 
applies is considered; confusion increases exponentially when 
one considers that this question has already been asked and 
answered.  Throughout discussions of the right of publicity 
violation and applicability of the First Amendment, the court 
intermittently drops references to Rush’s addition of a 
“significant creative component” to Woods’s “identity” and the 
reduction of “commercial value” in Woods’s likeness, making it 
look like the “transformative elements” test was really the only 
issue the court was considering after all.192  When the court 
actually addresses what it explicitly states is the 
“transformative elements” test, it repeats the same arguments 
and comes to a conclusion that the reader thought was already 
made by the court.193  Ultimately, the ETW Court’s failure to 
clearly and directly address the three questions it sets out to 
analyze results in an analysis that keeps the reader guessing 
where one question’s answer ends and where another’s begins, 
and which questions are even relevant, much less essential, to 
the court’s final decision in the case. 
c. The Necessary Use of Ohio Common Law Made the 
Analysis More Complex 
A third major factor that makes the ETW decision 
confusing is the fact that at the time of the decision, common 
law, rather than broad statutory law, governed the right of 
publicity in Ohio.194  The lack of case law regarding the right of 
 
 191. As noted supra note 184, if the court was intending to provide the 
parties and the reader with alternative arguments, it fails to make this clear. 
 192. ETW, 332 F.3d at 922-38. 
 193. See id. at 938.  The court ends this analysis by stating that “[b]ecause 
Rush’s work has substantial transformative elements, it is entitled to the full 
protection of the First Amendment.  In this case, we find that Woods’s right of 
publicity must yield to the First Amendment.”  Id.  As noted previously, the 
question of whether the work is entitled to the full protection of the First 
Amendment was already determined prior to the right of publicity analysis, 
and has nothing to do with whether the work has substantial transformative 
elements. 
 194. Id. at 929 n.15 (stating that the right of publicity was codified in the 
Ohio Revised Code, chapter 2741, in 1999).  However, the ETW litigation 
began before the effective date of the statute, and ETW did not invoke the 
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publicity in Ohio forced the court to plunge into unfamiliar 
territory with little or no guidance in its decision making 
process. 
As the court in ETW noted, Ohio did not have a statutory 
right of publicity until 1999.195  While it was clear to the court 
that a right of publicity existed, the Ohio case law on the 
subject was incredibly sparse.196  By contrast, the court in 
Comedy III had a broad California statute.  The California 
statute simply set forth the elements of a right of publicity and 
did not incorporate any First Amendment concerns.197  This 
made it much easier for the Comedy III court to determine first, 
whether the right of publicity existed and next, whether and 
how the First Amendment applied.  By contrast, the ETW court 
had to go through additional steps to define the right of 
publicity in Ohio.  This meant not only looking at Ohio cases, 
but also interpreting inconsistent federal court authority and 
Restatement provisions as well.198  Most of the cases the court 
considered incorporated First Amendment concerns in their 
primary lines of analysis, so the form of the right of publicity 
that the cases adopted did not match up with the idea of a First 
Amendment “affirmative defense.”199  Thus, when the court 
 
relevant provisions.  Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. The ETW court noted that the Ohio Supreme Court recognized the 
right of publicity in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., but that there 
were “few [other] Ohio decisions defining the contours of the right of publicity 
in the aftermath of Zacchini.”  See ETW, 332 F.3d at 929. 
 197. Comedy III Prod., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 800 (Cal. 
2001).  Section 990 of the California Civil Code stated, at the time the Comedy 
III litigation was commenced: 
Any person who uses a deceased personality’s name, voice, signature, 
photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in any products, 
merchandise or goods, or for purposes of advertising or selling, or 
soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise goods, or services, 
without prior consent from the person or persons specified in 
subdivision (c), shall be liable for any damages sustained by the 
person or persons injured as a result thereof. 
 Id. (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 1 (1984)).  The court noted that after it had 
granted review, the California legislature renumbered the statute as § 3344.1 
of the Civil Code, but that it was interpreting the former statute, so was 
referring to it as section 990.  Id. at 799 n.1 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 1 (1999)). 
 198. See supra notes 109-125 and accompanying text. 
 199. See supra notes 109-125 and accompanying text.  All the cases the 
ETW court considered were, naturally, decided before the Comedy III decision.  
While these cases were relevant to determining the basis for the Comedy III 
“transformative elements” test, the difficulty with relying on them as 
precedent was that the “transformative elements” test was intended to replace 
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described the right of publicity in Ohio, it included many of the 
concerns that underlie the “transformative elements” test 
before it even got to the test as a defense.  This is a major 
source of confusion since it makes the “transformative 
elements” test repeat the factors already considered by the 
court under the inquiry of whether the right of publicity exists. 
d. The Use of the Restatement and Accompanying Comments 
Ignored the Fact That the “Transformative Elements” Test Was 
Intended to Be an Affirmative Defense 
The final factor that casts doubt on the “transformative 
elements” test in ETW v. Jireh is the right of publicity 
definition the court eventually settles on.  The definition used 
by the court incorporates considerations used by the 
“transformative elements” test and thus ignores the fact that 
the test was intended to be an affirmative defense.200  
Consequently, the decision is unclear as to where the burden of 
proof lies on the issues in the case. 
After considering case law and possible interpretations of 
the right of publicity, the ETW court finally settled on a 
definition in the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 
47, including comment (d).201  In order to evaluate completely 
 
the different forms of analysis that they were decided upon. 
 200. The court stated: 
In sum, when an artist is faced with a right of publicity challenge to 
his or her work, he or she may raise as an affirmative defense that 
the work is protected by the First Amendment inasmuch as it 
contains significant transformative elements or that the value of the 
work does not derive primarily from the celebrity’s fame. 
Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 810. 
 201. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47: 
[T]he name, likeness, and other indicia of a person’s identity are used 
‘for purposes of trade under the rule stated in § 46 if they are used in 
advertising the user’s goods or services, or are placed on merchandise 
marketed by the user, or are used in connection with services 
rendered by the user.  However, uses ‘for purposes of trade’ does not 
ordinarily include the use of a person’s identity in news reporting, 
commentary, entertainment, works of fiction or nonfiction, or in 
advertising that is incidental to such uses. 
Id. at § 46.  The Right of Publicity states “[o]ne who appropriates the 
commercial value of a person’s identity by using without consent the person’s 
name, likeness, or other indicia of identity for purposes of trade is subject to 
liability for the relief appropriate under the rules stated in §§ 48 and 49.”  Id.  
Comment (d) of § 47 (which the ETW court said an Ohio court would construe 
its right of publicity as) states that “some courts have engaged in an analysis 
analogous to the determination of a fair use in copyright law.  The 
substantiality and market effect of the appropriation have been analyzed in 
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whether a right of publicity has been violated under this rule, a 
court has to look to “the substantiality and market effect of the 
use of the celebrity’s image . . . in light of the informational and 
creative content of the defendant’s use.”202  This is, essentially, 
what the “transformative elements” test does in its evaluation.  
When considering the “market effect” and “informational and 
creative content” in the right of publicity inquiry, the court is 
taking the burden of proof away from the defendant and 
placing it on the plaintiff, presumably a celebrity, in the first 
instance.  If a right of publicity under this rule exists, once a 
court gets to the question of “transformative elements”, there is 
little left to consider.  The existence of “transformative 
elements” has in large part been proven, or disproven, already.  
If a right of publicity does not exist under this rule, it is as if 
the “transformative elements” test has already been applied, 
with the plaintiff unfairly bearing the burden as to issues that 
the Comedy III court intended to place at the defendant’s 
feet.203  This upsets the balance that the Comedy III court 
forged with the “transformative elements” test and unfairly 
prejudices a plaintiff in an action to recover for infringement. 
2. How the ETW Court Should Have Analyzed the Case to 
Preserve the Future Value of the “Transformative Elements” 
Test 
a. Ways the Decision Could Have Been Improved 
There are a number of ways that the court in ETW could 
have improved the quality of its decision and preserved the 
value of the “transformative elements” test.  Most importantly, 
the court should have separated the Lanham Act and right of 
publicity claims, explained their substance and interaction with 
the First Amendment separately, and then applied them to the 
ETW facts in different sections.  This would have avoided many 
of the problems in the analysis by simply clarifying what logic 
applied to each cause of action and how future courts should 
use the First Amendment defenses in relation to both of them.  
Second, the court should have expressly stated the three-step 
inquiry it appeared to be engaging in, and then directly 
 
light of the informational or creative content of the defendant’s use.”  Id. at § 
47 cmt. d (1995).  This is essentially the Comedy III “transformative elements” 
test. 
 202. ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g., Inc., 332 F.3d at 937. 
 203. Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 810. 
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addressed each question, without borrowing language or 
reasoning from the other inquiries. 
The ETW court should have also defined the Ohio right of 
publicity differently.  The actual Restatement definition of the 
right of publicity is clear: “One who appropriates the 
commercial value of a person’s identity by using without 
consent the person’s name, likeness, or other indicia of identity 
for purposes of trade is subject to liability.”204  It is the 
comment from the subsequent section that takes this 
description and incorporates portions of the “transformative 
elements” test.  While the main part of the rule focuses on the 
celebrity, the comment focuses on the artist’s contribution, 
which is the proper function of the “transformative elements” 
affirmative defense.  Thus, the court should have ignored the 
comment and stuck to the basic rule for the purposes of 
determining whether Woods’s right of publicity was violated in 
this case. 
If the court had defined the Ohio right of publicity as such, 
it would have made the three step analysis it was trying to 
engage in much clearer.  Since Rush was selling a painting 
with Woods’s likeness on it without his consent, Woods’s right 
of publicity had been violated.  Yet as non-commercial speech, 
Rush’s painting was entitled to the full protection of the First 
Amendment.  Then the court could have moved on to a much 
better examination of the “transformative elements” inquiry. 
b. Applying the “Transformative Elements” Test 
Once the court finally arrived at the “transformative 
elements” test, it should have looked at the factors the Comedy 
III court set out in greater detail.  Under the first prong of the 
test, it appears that Rush probably added “significant 
expression” beyond just the “literal depiction or imitation” of 
Tiger Woods.205  While the focal point(s) of the painting are 
three images of Tiger, he is not the only person, thing, or even 
celebrity depicted.206  The golf course, the caddy, the scenery, 
and the historical setting of the event all add to the work.  
Tiger appears to be only one of many “raw materials”207 from 
 
 204. ETW, 332 F.3d at 930 (quoting RESTATEMENT UNFAIR COMPETITION, 
supra note 85, § 47 (1995)). 
 205. See Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 808-09. 
 206. ETW, 332 F.3d at 918, 919 n.1. 
 207. Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 809. 
JASMER FORMATTED 05/12/2004  12:55 PM 
334 MINNESOTA INTEL. PROPERTY REVIEW [Vol. 5:2 
 
which the painting is formed, considering the substantial 
portion of the work that is devoted to evoking images of past 
golf champions, the uniqueness of this moment in history, and 
the “feel” of the setting in which it takes place.  Undeniably, 
this work appears to be much more than just “Tiger”—it is 
capturing something much bigger.  Rush has sought to express 
not just the essence of “Tiger Woods,” but of golf, of Georgia, of 
history, and probably of the emotion of sports in general.  
Looking at the painting in a “quantitative” rather than 
“qualitative” manner,208 the literal or imitative elements of 
Tiger Woods are only three poses.  The “creative” elements are 
much more numerous. 
Under the second prong, the marketability prong, some of 
the value of the work does come from Tiger Woods himself.  
Many people who buy such a painting will be fans of Tiger 
Woods.  However, considering the following Rush has gathered, 
it is likely that a significant number of people who buy the 
painting are Rush fans as well.209  Others may be simply golf 
fans or fans of the historic golf legends in the painting.  Still 
others may be residents of Augusta who want to commemorate 
the event.  No matter what their reasons, it is probable that 
because the painting contains much more than just Tiger’s face, 
body, or likeness, its value is due at least as much to the other 
facets of expression in the painting as it is to Tiger.  Unlike the 
three bare faces depicted in Comedy III, there is so much more 
to the painting here than simply Tiger.  As a result, his fame, 
while significant, cannot account for its entire value. 
C. IMPLICATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE DECISIONS 
Considering the volume of criticism that accompanied the 
Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc.,210 
decision,211 the ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc.212 decision 
is likely to come under significant fire as well.  The problems 
with the ETW court’s analysis of the right of publicity will 
almost certainly add to the criticism of the “transformative 
elements” test.  Legal scholars already skeptical about the test 
will find much fuel for their fire in the ETW decision; the poor 
 
 208. Id. at 809. 
 209. See text accompanying notes 94-96. 
 210. 21 P.3d 797. 
 211. See supra notes 78-85 and accompanying text. 
 212. 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003). 
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organization, failure to address the appropriate issues at the 
appropriate times, and the incomplete use of the 
‘transformative elements” test exaggerates the problems 
inherent in using any standard to judge a piece of artwork.213 
However, courts that wish to adopt the “transformative 
elements” test can avoid these problems in the same ways the 
ETW court could have avoided problems.  First and foremost, 
the right of publicity claims should be clearly separated from 
other claims, such as the Lanham Act claims.  Courts should 
then identify the right of publicity statute or doctrine 
applicable in that jurisdiction, clearly define it, and determine 
whether that right has been violated.  If a court finds that it 
has been violated, the First Amendment defense may be raised 
by the defendant.  The First Amendment analysis consists of 
two basic parts.  First, defendant must show a particular piece 
of work is subject to full First Amendment protection.214  
Second, the defendant must fulfill the two pronged 
“transformative elements” test: she bears the burden of 
showing not only that her artwork contains significant 
“transformative elements” such that it has become “primarily 
[her] own expression rather than the celebrity’s likeness,”215 
but that the “marketability and economic value of the 
challenged work [does not] derive from the fame of the celebrity 
depicted” but “principally from some other source.”216  
Following this simple pattern will avoid confusion and allow 
courts to move forward with the “transformative elements” test, 
refining and molding it along the way to better address the 
concerns raised by legal scholars and assure that not only 
celebrities and artists, but society as a whole, is enhanced by 
the results of their decisions. 
 
 213. Legal standards used to judge art have difficulties such as vagueness, 
subjectivity, and difficulty in transferring the standard to different mediums. 
 214. How a court should go about doing this is controversial.  This 
comment saves that question for another day.  However, considering the fact 
that whether or not something like Rush’s work is entitled to the full 
protection of the First Amendment is still being discussed, any court seeking 
to provide a well thought out analysis and decision should therefore at least 
address the position that it is taking in that particular state or circuit.  See 
supra note 47. 
 215. Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 809. 
 216. Id. at 810. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
In ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc.,217 the court 
adopted the “transformative elements” test first elaborated in 
Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc.218  The test 
states: 
 When artistic expression takes the form of a literal depiction or 
imitation of a celebrity for commercial gain, directly trespassing on 
the right of publicity without adding significant expression beyond 
that trespass, the state law interests in protecting the fruits of 
artistic labor outweighs the expressive interests of the imitative 
artist.219 
However, “when a work contains significant transformative 
elements, it is not only especially worthy of First Amendment 
protection, but is also less likely to interfere with the economic 
interest protected by the right of publicity.”220  Attempting to 
provide a detailed analysis of the First Amendment and right of 
publicity issues in the case, the ETW court examined both state 
and federal jurisprudence regarding the right of publicity and 
the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition.  It then 
determined that Ohio case law and the Restatement (Third) of 
Unfair Competition would determine whether Rush’s prints 
violated Woods’s right of publicity.  To draw the line “between 
Woods’s intellectual property rights and the First Amendment”, 
the court stated that it would follow the reasoning of decisions 
in both the Ninth and Tenth Circuits.221  Finally, the court 
decided that balancing the First Amendment and the right of 
publicity would be done under the “transformative elements” 
test.222  Through a confusing and disjointed application of these 
principles, the court concluded that Tiger Woods’s right of 
publicity did not trump Rush’s First Amendment rights and 
granted summary judgment in favor of Rush. 
The “transformative elements” test as established by the 
Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc.223 court is 
practicable because it strikes the appropriate balance between 
the celebrity’s interests and the artist’s rights, and leaves room 
for courts to make the fact specific determinations necessary to 
ensure fair results in unavoidably subjective decisions.  In 
 
 217. 332 F.3d 915. 
 218. 21 P.3d 797. 
 219. Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 808. 
 220. Id. 
 221. ETW, 332 F.3d at 936. 
 222. Id. 
 223. 21 P.3d 797. 
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addition, alternatives proposed up to this point do not offer 
realistic suggestions for either increasing clarity or decreasing 
subjectivity in court decisions, nor do they address the 
significant economic benefits that celebrities receive from some 
unauthorized use of their identities. 
Yet the decision in ETW puts the “transformative 
elements” test in jeopardy because the court’s analysis makes 
the test appear confusing and unworkable.  However, a close 
analysis of the decision reveals that a number of other factors 
in the court’s decision contribute: the court uses an 
inappropriate structure to tackle the problem, it fails to answer 
the questions it asks, the use of Ohio common law made the 
analysis more complex, and the court’s use of the Restatement 
and accompanying comments to determine whether Woods had 
a right of publicity leads it to ignore the fact that the 
“transformative elements” test was intended to be an 
affirmative defense. 
The ETW court should have separated the Lanham Act and 
right of publicity claims and then explained and applied their 
interaction with the First Amendment and the facts of ETW 
separately.  It should have also directly addressed the three 
questions it asked at the outset of the analysis and avoided 
overlapping language and reasoning between them.  In sum, a 
court addressing a similar case in the future has a simple, 
straightforward task: identify the right of publicity statute or 
doctrine applicable in that jurisdiction, clearly define it, and 
determine whether that right has been violated.  Further, the 
First Amendment defense may be raised by the defendant, who 
must first show that a particular piece of work is subject to full 
First Amendment protection.  The defendant must then meet 
the requirements of the “transformative elements” test by 
demonstrating that the artwork contains significant 
transformative elements such “that it has become primarily the 
defendant’s own expression rather than the celebrity’s 
likeness”,224 and that the “marketability and economic value of 
the challenged work [does not] derive from the fame of the 
celebrity depicted” but “principally from some other source.”225  
If a court sticks to this analysis, many of the confusions that 
look inevitable after the ETW decision will disappear, and 
courts will be able to judge the “transformative elements” test 
 
 224. Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 809. 
 225. Id. at 810. 
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on its true worth.  If necessary, courts can refine the test to 
address the concerns raised by legal scholars in both writing 
and practice.  A better analysis will lead to a better test, which, 
in the end ensures that the public receives greater benefits 
from both the right of publicity and the First Amendment with 
reduced costs. 
 
